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Abstract 
Abnormal operation of chemical processes caused by equipment and sensor faults, 
such as plugging of pipes, control system failure or improper operation by personnel can 
result in poor product quality, equipment damage, or a catastrophe process failure leading 
to loss of equipment and worker injury, as well as significant economic losses. It is 
estimated that the cost attributable to preventable losses in the petrochemical industry 
only is around several billion pounds per year. Independent studies of case histories by 
the Health and Safety Commission in the UK and by a Honeywell led industrial 
consortium in the US and world wide show that human errors represent the major cause 
of failures. In contrast to this discovery, the majority of pervious studies on computer 
aided systems for fault detection and diagnosis has focussed on the process side only. It is 
now widely acknowledged that there is only limited information on how human factors 
can be assessed and even less that is specific to chemical industry, therefore research is 
much needed in this area. 
This study presents a methodology to involve human factors into the development 
of systems for automatic identification and diagnosis of abnormal operations and 
develops methods and techniques that can be used to simultaneously capture, characterise 
and assess the performance of operators as well as of the process. A joint process - 
operator simulation platform was developed which was used as a test-bed for carrying out 
the studies. The process part is a simulator, which emulates in high fidelity the dynamic 
behaviour of the process, which is subject to influence of various disturbances and 
operators intervention. The operator module was developed as a real-time expert system, 
which emulates operator's behaviour in interpretation of received signals, planning and 
executions of the decisions. The interaction between the two modules is managed through 
an interaction module, which handles the real-time exchange of data using DDE 
(Dynamic Data Exchange). The interaction module also contains the toolkits for 
analysing the dynamic behaviour of the joint process-operator system. 
The operator simulation module was developed based on a theoretical model of 
human behaviour, which breaks operator's activities into perception of signals and 
V 
interpretation of the received information, planning for actions and execution of the 
decisions. The system was implemented as a real-time expert system using visual Prolog. 
Numerical models were also integrated into the expert system, e. g. stress models of 
operators. This flexible system allows studies on individual operators actions, stress, 
intervene time, the frequency of intervene and near-miss or near-hit in operation. 
As part of the effort to use the platform to develop methods and tools for 
characterising and assessing the dynamic behaviour of the joint process-operator system, 
a digraph method for qualitative /quantitative modelling of the dynamic behaviour of the 
combined system was proposed. The method involves categorical characterisation of 
dynamic trends using principal component analysis and ftizzy c-means and sectioning of 
the clusters. An iterative method for determining the number of the clusters and sections 
based on the global performance was derived. Compared with pervious studies on 
qualitative process modelling, the proposed approach is more accurate and has higher 
resolution, and more importantly is able to deal with joint process-operator systems. 
The methods and systems developed were illustrated and fully tested using 
simulated and industrial case studies. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.1 The Background 
Operational safety of processes is of paramount importance and therefore should be 
the first objective of process control (Marlin, 2000). Problems caused by operational 
faults range from increased operational costs to forced shutdown of processes. In some 
cases, it can result in catastrophic fire and/or explosion. The complexity and the increased 
degree of integration of modem chemical plants means that the potential economic loss is 
greater when a fault occurs and the diagnosis of fault locations becomes more difficult. 
Apart from alarms, modem computer control systems are not yet equipped with 
systems that can automatically predict and detect the abnormal operations and diagnose 
fault locations. The safety issue is addressed in three layers as depicted in Fig I. I. The 
inner layers is the plant control system which consists of control loops that can reject 
common cause variations or disturbances and maintain steady state operation, as well as 
alarm systems and recovery options. The middle layer is comprised of prediction systems 
that require power supply. They include interlocks, energy shutdown systems, fire and 
gas detection systems and dual and backup systems. The outer layer provides the final 
protection, if everything including power supply fails. This is done through selection and 
design of inherently safe equipment and devices, for example, through minimisation of 
inventories, containment, selection of pressure devices and fail-safe design. It is the plant 
operators who play the crucial role of continuously assessing the operational status and 
diagnose abnormal situations that the inner control layer cannot cope with and take 
necessary actions to prevent process shutdown. 
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Fig I. I. Layers of the operational process 
safety of computer control systems. 
To help operators to assess operational status, computer control systems collect and 
display a large amount of information. The information, however is overloaded where 
critical decisions about process operation have to be made very quickly by plant 
personnel: in a chemical plant, a few hundred to over fifty-thousand variables may be 
measured and sampled as frequently as every minute or less. During the periods of 
abnormal operation, often too many alarms are issued and too many variables are 
evolving irregularly. Case histories show that operators do not always make correct 
decisions. 
As a result, there have been tremendous interests in developing methods and 
techniques for automatic interpretation of operational data, and for fault detection and 
diagnosis. These include investigation into real time expert systems, supervised and 
unsupervised neural networks, statistical process control, fuzzy logic, qualitative 
reasoning and wavelets. The most important progress has been made in the last ten to 
fifteen years and the work has been reviewed by numerous researchers such as Dash and 
Venkatasubramanian (2000), Himmelblau (2000), and Wang (1999) from different 
perspectives and a more comprehensive review will be made in chapter 2 of this thesis. 
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1.2 Motivations of the Research 
Case histories of failure revealed a very important discovery that human errors 
represent the major factor of failures. According to a survey conducted by a consortium 
led by Honeywell around the world including USA, UK, Canada, Europe and Japan about 
40% of abnormal operations were caused by human errors (Nimmo, 1995). In a parallel 
study by the Health and Safety Commission (Lardner and Fleming, 1996), it was found 
that 80% of accidents that involve a factor of human errors. Previous work on automatic 
process fault detection and diagnostic systems will no doubt help reduce the load of 
operators by providing them with quick solutions. However they have not fully 
addressed the issue of human factors or human errors in process operational safety. 
Firstly, most previous studies have assumed that after a fault occurring the process will 
evolve without operator intervention, this is clearly an ideal situation. In addition almost 
all of the previous efforts have focused on automatic assessment of the process behaviour. 
No effort has been made on automatic monitoring and assessment of operators 
performance. A good example of human factor is 'near-miss' or 'near-hit' operations. It 
can be useful if such operations can be captured automatically and fed back to the 
operators. As indicated by the Health and Safety Executive (UK), there is only limited 
information on how human factors can be assessed and even less that is specific to 
chemical industry. Studies on human factors in operational process safety have mainly 
been conducted by human behaviour and ergonomic scientists, psychologist and 
statisticians using various approaches such as statistical analysis of past incidents, 
interview and questionnaires, and tests of operators at certain conditions. The work has 
been aimed at discovering common human factors so that better computer displays and 
improved management and company culture can be developed. However, chemical 
engineers interest in process safety has mainly focused on the plant and its monitoring 
and control systems, probably because human factors are often regarded as a management 
and culture issue. It is often considered difficult to capture and assess information on 
human factors more scientifically, rigorously and faithfully, especially for information, 
which'is specific to individuals (Johnson, 1999). It is well known that operators vary in 
skill (Juespert and McAvoy, 1994). One operator may exhibit better control than the 
others. The resulting fluctuations in control quality cause corresponding fluctuations in 
process conditions, creating unprofitable or even unsafe situations. If the skills of 
experienced and inexperienced operators were continuously monitored, captured, 
characterised and analysed, the knowledge can be used to improve the operators skills 
and develop better abnormal management strategies and even improve process design. An 
4 
important progress in addressing operators skills is the use of dynamic training 
simulators. It is estimated that using a training simulator, an operator can experience more 
scenarios in weeks than operating in the real plant for months even years. However, based 
on the several years of experience of developing dynamic training simulators for refining 
and petrochemical industries, it is our belief that it is an unrealistic expectation that 
operators can experience all scenarios on a simulator that they may meet later. 
1.3 Objectives 
The overall aims of the research were to develop a methodology and system to 
involve human factors into the development of systems for automatic identification and 
diagnosis of abnormal operations, and to investigate methods and techniques that can be 
used to capture, characterise and assess the performance of the operators, as well as that 
of the process. More specifically the research objectives are described below: 
(1) Developing a joint process-operator platform for carrying out the study. The joint 
process-operator platform will be a dynamic environment, consisting of a dynamic 
simulator of the process, system that models the operators behaviour in supervising 
and controlling the process, as well as an interaction module which manages the data 
transformation and real-time exchange of data between the process and the operator 
evaluation system. The interaction module also serves as an interface for monitoring 
the joint system behaviour. 
(2) Study the theoretical models for modelling operators cognitive behaviour and action 
in process operation and develop a high fidelity and easy to modify system to reflect 
varied scenarios of operators behaviour. 
(3) Develop methodologies and techniques that can be used to capture, characterise and 
assess the dynamic behaviour of the joint process operator system as well as the 
performance of operators. 
(4) Validate the above methods and systems using case studies. 
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1.4 Organization of the Thesis 
The thesis is organized as follows: 
Chapter 2 provides a critical review of the literature for the topics of this research, 
focusing and integrating the areas selected for development. It also sets the context in 
which the problem will be approached. It involves the critique of real-time expert systems 
univariate and multivariate statistical process control, supervised and unsupervised neural 
networks as well as data processing technique, hybrid systems, and digraphs. The 
purpose is not to exhaust the literature; rather it is aimed at comparing the methods and 
highlight areas that need further research. 
Chapter 3 describes the role and implementation issues of the process-operator 
interaction system. This is a platform consisting of three components: the process 
simulator, the operator module and the interaction system. The process simulator 
simulates dynamicAy the behaviour of the process under the influence of disturbance. 
The operator module emulates the behaviour of the operators, while the interaction 
module manages data exchange and serves as an interface. 
Chapter 4 describes the theoretical models of human behaviour and develops a 
system of operator behaviour. The system is implemented as a real-time expert system, 
which emulates operator's behaviour in perception and interpretation of signals, and 
planning and execution of actions. 
Chapter 5 describes the role and the implementation issues of the process operator 
interaction module, reviews other modules and discuses the proposed interaction module 
with the aid of process operator condition monitoring examples. 
In chapter 6, a new digraph method for qualitatively modelling process dynamic 
behaviour is proposed. The chapter also reviews a number of digraph methods, discuses 
the problem of clustering the principal components, proposes an optimisation method for 
clustering and sectioning and propose a number of sectioning methods. 
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Chapter 7 examines the methodology proposed in chapter six using application to 
the CSTR case study. A number of qualitative models will be developed from the process 
variables trends, such as product temperature and concentration output trends. It also 
discusses and uses the ANOVA analysis during the evaluation of the models developed. 
Finally chapter 8 surnmarises the findings and gives suggestions for future work. 
/ 
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Chapter 2 
Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides a critical review of the literature for the topics of this research, 
focusing and integrating the areas selected for development. It also sets the context in which 
the problem will be approached. 
In section 2.2, we will analyse the challenges facing on-line monitoring and fault 
diagnosis of chemical processes, and present some classification schemes of computer-based 
techniques for process monitoring and fault diagnosis. We will then make a review of the 
techniques which have been studied in the last ten to fifteen years, including real-time expert 
systems (section 2.3), univariate and multivariate statistical process control (SPC and MSPQ 
(section 2.4), supervised and unsupervised neural networks (section 2.5), as well as data pre- 
processing techniques, hybrid systems, and graph theory based signed digraphs (SDG) 
(section 2.6). The techniques that will be used in this work, for example MSPC will be 
reviewed in more detail than others. Some methods will be only very briefly mentioned 
because they will be described in more detail in later chapters, for instance, the graph theory 
based SDG. Section 2.7 is dedicated to reviewing the work on how human factors can be 
considered in developing monitoring and fault diagnosis systems. A brief summary of this 
chapter will be made in section 2.8. 
2.2 Computer Based Systems for Process Monitoring and Fault 
Diagnosis 
ZZI Computer Based Process Control Systems 
Traditional computer based process control systems do not have fault detection and 
diagnosis functions. Process operational safety is addressed at three levels in equipment and 
control system design. At the center it is the automatic control loops, which are responsible 
for steady state and normal operation, and therefore the disturbances should be handled at 
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this layer. The middle layer is called the active safety layer, which includes hardware and 
software protection. The layer represents an extra safety protection system but needs power 
in order to act. The outer layer is called passive safety layer. It means that when every thing 
else fails, such as failure in power supply, the inherent safety equipment design will provide 
the final protection. 
Clearly the three layered control and protection design does not include tools that can 
help operators to carry out the task of analysing the data collected and assessing the 
operational status. It has long been recognised that the information collected by computer 
control systems tends to overwhelm operators and makes it difficult to take quick and correct 
decisions, especially in critical circumstances. There is a clear need to develop 
methodologies and tools to automate data interpretation and analysis's in order to provide 
operators with assessment of states of operation and guidance in how to make adjustments. 
The methodologies and tools should become part of a computer control system 
configuration. 
Many methods on computer aided operational decision support systems have been 
developed over the last ten to fifteen years, but little information is available on 
benchmarking these methods. Dash and Venkatasubramanian (2000) summarised some 
issues that need to be considered in benchmarking the techniques. These include, 
(1) The ability to give early detection and diagnosis of faults. 
(2) Isolation, to be able to discriminate between faults. Some faults may give similar 
responses therefore isolation refers to the resolution of a method. 
(3) Robustness in the presence of noise and uncertainties in measurements. 
(4) Novelty of identification, referring to the capability to be able to diagnose faults, which 
were not experienced before. 
(5) Multiple fault identification. 
(6) Explanation facility. Some methods do not have explanation facilities, reducing the 
confidence of users. 
(7) Adaptability to changes in processes. 
(8) Speed. 
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Some other researchers have addressed these issues in more specific terms, for 
example, whether a method is recursive or not recursive. The former allows on-line learning 
using data continuously collected and the existing knowledge that has been learned will not 
be corrupted. In contrast, the later always needs a batch of new data to be mixed with 
previous data. The consideration is clearly related to adaptability of a method but is more 
rigorous and specific. 
ZZ2 Classification of Computer Based Techniques for Fault Detection and 
Diagnosis 
The work on computer aided fault detection and diagnosis has been recently reviewed 
by a number of researchers such as Dash and Venkatasubramanian (2000), Himmelblau 
(2000) and Wang (1999) from different perspectives. 
Dash and Venkatasubramanian (2000) broadly classified the methods into process 
model based and process historical data based, as depicted in Figure 2.1. 
Diagnostic 
Methods 
Process Model 
Based 
I 
T 
ProCess History 
Data Based 
-r-- 
I 
Quantitative 
Methods 
- Residual based 
- Observers 
- Parity space 
- Assumption 
based 
Qualitative Quantitative 
Methods 
[Methods 
1 
I 
-N 
Qualitative 
Methods 
Qualitative Trend 
Analysis (QTA) 
Rule Based 
-Causal Models - Neural Nets 
- Signed Digraphs - Statistical 
. 10 
1 
Fig. 2.1. Classification of fault diagnostic methods (Dash and Venkatasubramanian, 2000). 
10 
ZZZ I Process Model Based Methods 
Process model based methods use qualitative knowledge and quantitative models 
extracted from process principles. The model represents the interacting relationships between 
various process variables. The philosophy of the approaches are founded upon the 
assumption that a fault will cause changes to certain physical parameters which in turn will 
lead changes in some of the model parameters or states. It is then possible to detect and 
diagnose these faults by monitoring the estimated model parameters or states. 
The methods based on process models can further be sub-divided into qualitative 
causal models and quantitative methods. The strategy employed in qualitative models is the 
cause-effect reasoning about system behaviour. The most popular methods arefault-trees 
and signed digraphs (SDG). Fault trees (Lapp and Powers, 1977) use backward chaining 
until a primary event is found that presents a possible root cause for observed process 
deviation. Signed digraphs (Iri et al., 1979) is another representation of the causal 
information in which the process variables are represented as graph nodes and causal 
relations by directed arcs. Causal model-based methods mimic human reasoning and so 
explanation generation is relatively straightforward making them more interactive. 
Quantitative methods for fault detection and diagnosis based on process models can be 
accurate since process models come from underlying first principles. However, 
comprehensive theoretical models for complex processes can be very difficult to develop. 
This is because fault identification and diagnosis is the inverse of dynamic process 
simulation. In the dynamic process simulation, the purpose is to model the dynamic 
behaviour of the process subject to disturbances, while the task of fault detection and 
diagnosis is to find the cause of disturbance or faults for observed process dynamic response. 
ZZZ2 Process History Data Based Methods 
Process history data based methods make use of the history data of process operation. 
Data and knowledge for fault identification and diagnosis can be extracted. The knowledge 
can be rules and formulations. The methods also can be further divided into qualitative 
methods, such as rule-based, and quantitative methods, such as neural networks and 
statistical approaches. 
One of the most popular data based methods is the neural network. Neural networks 
can learn from data the relationship between the symptoms of faults and their causes and 
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store them as network weights. The trained network can then be used to diagnose subsequent 
faults by associating the observed malfunction with the corresponding previously identified 
fault. 
Another data driven method, which has received much attention is statistical process 
control (SPC). The traditional SPC based on Shewhart and CUSUM charts are well 
established for monitoring univariate processes, but they do not function well for 
multivariable processes with highly correlated variables. A notable recent development is on 
multivariate statistical process control (MSPC), which proves to be an effective diagnostic 
tool for monitoring and detection of process faults for both continuous and batch processes 
(e. g., MacGregor and Kourti, 1995; Neogi and Schlags, 1998; Dunia et al., 1996; Chen et al., 
1996; Negiz and Cinar 1997; Dong and McAvoy, 1996a). 
Wang (1999) classified fault detection and diagnosis techniques based on learning 
from previous process history data according to the following scheme: (1) data pre- 
processing techniques for noise removal, dimension reduction and feature extraction, such as 
wavelets and qualitative interpretation of dynamic trends; (2) supervised and unsupervised 
clustering algorithms, i. e. training based classification such as back propagation neural 
networks and automatic clustering using neural and statistical algorithms; (3) numerical and 
conceptual clustering approaches; as well as (4) decision tree and rule based methods. 
Another consideration in examining a learning method is recursive (or incremental) or not 
recursive (non-incremental). The former learns from one data set at one time, i. e. updating 
the knowledge, which was learned using previous data every time a new data set is 
presented. In this case the existing knowledge is updated without any corrpptions. The latter 
needs to learn on a mass of training examples, i. e. when a new data set is present, it has to be 
combined with the previous data. Recursive methods are particularly useful for online use, 
because in online applications, data is continuously received. These conditions provide a 
useful scheme for analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of various techniques. 
There are many other new techniques being investigated for process monitoring and 
diagnosis, such as wavelets (Kosanovich and Pi ovoso, 1997; Bakshi, 1998; Chen at al., 1999, 
Wang et al., 1999), and image analysis techniques (13harati and MacGregor, 1998). 
2.3 Real-Time Expert Systems 
An expert system (ES) is a knowledge-based system that makes use of knowledge 
acquired from one or more human experts. It often includes a knowledge base, an inference 
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engine and a database. ESs are designed to advise on a solution method, offer objective 
advice, make available the best experiences to others, evolve as knowledge and heuristics are 
added, and be capable of explaining decisions or recommendations and be a repository of 
experience which can evolve continuously. ES was one of the first few artificial intelligence 
techniques studied for on-line process fault detection and diagnosis (e. g., Moore and Kramer, 
1986). The success of the object-oriented real-time expert system G2 of Gensyrn was a clear 
indication of its attraction. Early real-time ESs used rules summarised by domain experts and 
the capability in describing process dynamic behavior was limited. For example, G2 used 
simple descriptors to describe the dynamic transient behaviour, such as increase and 
decrease. 
The advantages of knowledge based systems are that the knowledge used for fault 
diagnosis is causal and transparent; heuristic rules can be easily added to and removed from 
the rule base and rigorous process model is not needed; and human experts knowledge and 
experience can be easily stored and used. However, ESs are known to have the following 
limitations: 
(1) Rules are often obtained from human experts, therefore are often subjective. If the rules 
are not sufficient and do not describe all the operation and possible faults, then the ES 
developed may not be very useful and need continuous upgrading to include 
information about the newly developed faults, which were not included in the initial 
stages of the development. 
(2) ESs often does not have learning capability and therefore cannot dynamically improve 
its performance. 
(3) Qualitative interpretation of plant measurement inevitably leads to loss of information. 
(4) Because of the complexity of the dynamic behaviour and the interactions between the 
variables of a process under fault conditions, the experienced human experts may not 
have the necessary expertise to describe the causal relationships, therefore knowledge 
acquisition represents the bottleneck in developing real-time expert systems for process 
fault detection and diagnosis (i. e. knowledge about the process faults and abnormal 
operations rarely happen and hence they are very hard to obtain because during the real 
time process operation fewer abnormal operations can be experienced). 
(5) Rules can be in conflicting when the size of the knowledge base is large. 
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(6) The overall causal relationships of all process variables may be buried in a large rule 
base, making it far more complex to be viewed clearly by decision makers. 
There has been some progress in addressing some limitations of expert systems, for 
instance, the use of inductive learning to automatically extract knowledge rules from data 
(Wang et al., 1997; Wang, 1999). Progress in qualitative interpretation of dynamic trends 
(Janusz and Venkatasubramanian, 1991, Bakshi and Stephanopoulos, 1994 a&b) also makes 
it possible for using expert systems to describe complex dynamic behaviour of processes 
under fault conditions, with minimum loss of information. 
Despite the rapid development of other techniques such as neural networks and 
statistical methods, the interests in expert systems remain, especially in its combined use 
with other techniques to develop hybrid systems. McGuin and Tolman (1996) coupled the 
real-time expert system G2 of Gensym. with dynamic simulation system SpeedUp of Aspen 
Tech for use in on-line process monitoring, supervisory control and fault diagnosis. The G2 
real time ES was interfaced with SpeedUp simulation model to exploit the various 
advantages associated with shallow, deep, compiled and rule-based knowledge. Leung and 
Romagnoli (2000) developed a real time ES, also using G2, which comprises of three major 
elements, monitoring and assessment for control state monitoring and classification, decision 
support for providing operator guidance and a heuristic-based adaptation mechanism to 
intelligently response to any change in control scenarios. Jong and Poong (2000) studied the 
dynamic aspects of fault diagnostic systems in nuclear power plants. They developed an 
operator decision support system, which was aimed at increasing the efficiency of the plant 
and to reduce the human error and cognitive workload that may cause accidents. The system 
consists i0f a knowledge base, an inference engine and a user interface. 
2.4 Univariate and Multivariate, Statistical Process Control (SPC 
and MSPC) 
SPC and MSPC have been widely studied in the last several years. Reviews can be 
found in Russell et al., (2000), Kourti and MacGregor (1995), MacGregor and Kourti (1995), 
Li (2000), Wise and Gallagher (1996), Cinar and Undey (1999), Wang (1999), and Martin 
and Morris (1996). 
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Z4.1 MSPC Based on Principal Component Analysis (PCA) 
MSPC is an extension of univariate SPC using PCA. PCA is a dimension reduction 
technique, which reduces the dimensionality of a data set consisting of a large number of 
interrelated variables, while retaining as much as possible of the variation present in the data. 
PCA uses all the original variables to obtain a smaller set of new variables, i. e. principal 
components (PCs) that can be used to approximate the original variables. The PCs represent 
a new set of co-ordinates that are orthogonal to each other. The first PC is the linear 
combination of the original variables and indicates the direction of the greatest variation in 
data. The second PC is also a linear combination of the original variables and describes the 
next dominant direction of variation, but is orthogonal to the first PC. The same number of 
PCs as the original variables can be calculated but only the first few PCs are used to 
represent the feature of the data, because the remaining PCs are often considered as 
representing noise. 
Univariate SPC uses control charts, most noticeably the Shewhart charts. An example 
of univariate Shewhart charts is given in Fig. 2.2. At common cause variation, e. g., random 
disturbances, the values of variables should satisfy a normal distribution centred on the mean 
g with a standard deviation a. The upper and lower control limits (UCL and LCL) can be set 
as +cr and -cy, then the probability that the value of the variable goes outside UCL and LCL is 
less than 5%. Higher than 5% is an indication of potential occurrence of special cause 
variation, or faults. The UCL and LCL can also be set as +2cr and -2a, and +3a and -3cr, 
then the probability limits become 4%, 3% or less. 
Because of the multivariate nature of process operational states, monitoring of 
operation based on univariate SPC is some times not sufficient: even all the variables are 
within the UCL and LCL, it does not mean that the process is definitely within the normal 
zone of the multidimensional space. Hotelling's (1947) developed the multivariate Shewhart 
charts, the T2 charts. The 95%, 98% and 99% on a T2 chart can also be calculated. 
15 
Upper control limit 
>c< 
>0< XK Centre line Mean 
XK >OC >CK 
>CK 
Lower control limit 
Inc 
XX >oc 
>oc 
-*-Common cause ---IM- 
Special cause 
Fig. 2.2. Univariate Shewhart chart. 
Time 
PCA based MSPC is based on the observation that many of the process variables are 
auto-coffelated, only a few underlying events are driving a process at any time, and all these 
measurements are simply different reflections of these same underlying events. It means that 
only the first PCs can be used, rather then all the original variables. If A PCs are used, the 
Hotelling's TO can be calculated by, 
t2 
St 
Where tj is the principal components and S2 is the estimated variance of ti. t, 
(2.1) 
However 7-2 will only detect whether or not the variation in the original variables in 
the plane of the first A PCs is greater than can be explained by common cause. If a totally 
new type of special event occurs, it can be detected by computing the squared prediction 
error (SPE) of the residual of a new observation, 
SPE (ynew, i-Ynew, i) 1-1 
(2.2) 
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where y is computed from the reference PCA model. SPE is also referred to the distance 
to the PCA model. It represents the squared perpendicular distance of a new multivariate 
observation from the projection space. 
To find out the original variables that are responsible for the observed yQ and SPE 
exceeding the control limits, contribution plots are used. Fig. 2.3 shows that the variable that 
has the most important impact on SPE is variable 7. Fig. 2.4 indicates that the main variable 
that contributes to the first principal component tj is variable 9. 
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Fig. 2.3. Contribution plot of a process at a sampling point. 
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Fig. 2.4. Contribution plot to score of a process at a sampling point. 
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Z4.2 Application of MSPC Based on Principal Component Analysis (PCA) 
Many researchers have successfully used multivariate statistical techniques based on 
PCA and PLS (Partial Least Square) in process monitoring, product design, fault detection, 
disturbance diagnosis and data analysis and on-line monitoring of batch processes. A 
comprehensive reviews have been made by MacGregor and Kourti (1995), Wise and 
Gallagher (1996), Cinar and Undey (1999), Wang (1999), Martin and Morris (1996), and 
Russell et al. (2000). 
Z4. Zl MSPCfor Continuous Process Monitoring 
Kresta, et al. first studied PCA based on MSPC in 1991 but most of the progress was 
made in the last five years. Table 2.1 summarises the major publications on MSPC for 
monitoring and diagnosis of continuous processes. These studies have focused on the 
following issues: 
(1) Application of the methods, which were initially developed based on simulation studies 
to industrial processes (Kosanovich and Piovoso, 1997, Santen et al., 1997, Bakshi, 
1998, Vedarn and Venkatasubramanian, 1999, Jaeckle and MacGregor, 2000, Chen and 
Wang, 2000). 
(2) Application of the methods to more complex processes (Raich and Clinar, 1996, 
Kosanovich and Piovoso, 1997, Santen et al., 1997, Bakshi, 1998, Chen and McAvoy, 
1998, Chen and Wang, 2000). 
(3) Study on fundamental issues of MSPC such as detectability, reconstruction and 
isolation ability (Dunia and Qin, 1998). 
(4) Integration of MSPC with other techniques such as wavelets (Bakshi, 1998). 
(5) Detailed examination on contribution plots. 
(6) Product design (Jaeckle and MacGregor, 1998; Chen and Wang, 2000). 
cm 
cm 
gn 
u 2 92. 4) 0- 1, .0 
cz-. Ze, cä 
0 
cm ý 
E 
uý 
3 
. 13 
*r. -o Ei 
P. p4 
r. ý 0 
u 0.0 2 0 0 
-8 ý.; ýO, - 
uý 9 
e 
. Ili t; 
g 
Pý A 1 
4) 
ý4 a %2 0 c!. -a :j 0 
N-3 8- -m 
4 iz ý cu 
:j -0 
0 j - c2 
O> -4 
g 
fo g 
Cm cn 
E r. cm 1 
e 
.2 -o DM 2 
K8- 
b ci ig 
bbC3 
0ä 
ä 
52 
, I: ' 0 Ei tn 1 ý4 
M48 r. ä 
m 
-0 
m 
m 
u &l m - 
u 
9 
u9 
9A 
2, 
ce 
Q -2 
1 
,2 ý . 
r. 
5 A ý1 - m 2 
0 
A 
1 
Go l. -0 < 1 i Gn p4 92 
Ei 
`K -1 
e KI 
:i 
ý rz U) e 
ý3 iýi P. p4 gLe 94 ý4 c4 
P. 0. 
4 
(5 
to cm . Iti .2 13 
a -0 t) 2 ý il t:: n *v 'n .2 '8 Cd 
0 
m 
8 
2 .5 -0 g 
-A 0 
.j :3. 8 
ä 
: 
-j; 
«Z) 
m 
5 
9 
a 
ä0 0 9 
0 
JA 
Ei 5 
0 3 za gn 
.; 2 EI t u Iti 92. m 1 924 g rA 92. i H ý 
> s. 12. Z 0 0. 92w 12. 
9 
92w z2 Ei (n ;89 gL9 2 Ln 
cr 
9 d 
lb 9 gz 0% 2 g 
1 5 9 Ei i 
zr »! f - .c --r j e V% i tr ä %0 Cf u g, 
9 
rý ý 9 u "" KZ & > ý2 
m 
;2& Z5 CA & EI A s', 2 U& - - 2- L -- ý - 
Gn 
bo 
Q 
st 
0 
ag 
12 
-0 ,a 
k- 
0 
t) g. to m 
h- S. 4% , - 8 
A j2 , m ev 8 = ;ö JA t42 tl 
gzw cr ca 
9 A e, 
-ci ;2 -Ei 
e 
s ]e 1e e 
9 
-, 2 
e 
- 
12 
4ý 
0 
9 
.2 
41 la , 
tu 
IN > 
M 
4b, 
10 ýr 
Z 
0 
. lý r. 2 0 '0 8 Ei 
CA 
& < -ýi u u 0. -e 
4g 0 
Z 10 Ici 
.5A 
4. 
82 
ew 
.2 
< 
ig 
j, s 33 U) d , gt U ZZ e -0 ný i 
. 52 
< -0 2 B. A -3 A -a & ij Z., 
A ci p. 0 
ae 0 bo = A 
U 
A 
-1 : in < u 
2 0 e *r. 
5 22 2 -ti :5 It: r3 cý, 2 ä4 
Je KA 2 fA Vi << 23 < 
ÖD to 
2. ri t u 
l' 
m -0 cm t t 
P. P. P. 
la 
tko r. 0 30 
Eh 
. u 
6 
.- z1 Ei r 
*5 
8 
,g i3 
4 8 2 
A , 9 
1 tn jj 
1 - l 
8 
09 "a g 4g j3 E 9 g g0 -0 
5 a 
2 ý, - 8 8 cl 's 
y 
Ei 
<u ib M l 
D 0) 0 c) J 91 
o Gn 122 u t2. ei Ew 
00 00 
CY 00 2 sb t' zý bb . 12 
13 2 E - 
Ei 
cs 
z 
KA 
vi 
0. 
. w0 -a Ei 
9-8 
T: 
: 50 
4 
ýt- 
0 
9 
' 
09 
A V) 
.3 
U- A. - 
0 -M 
fg r1. - *Z; 
4 
c: L. 2 
8 
2E 
;Z 9 ýýo ? *u u 4. 
- *g 
2 -0 Co -0 N *g 
F i' >w e = 8, A9 5: . 9 mo 8m -8 --A 
1 
Iä ' 
1 
. 
rz p s. 0 9 
u s 
ý 
m 
1.. 
u 
E 
9 
.2 1 
1 
- cz ,AJä .m ý ý 2 A v' 10 ý; <u iz gl. r- :: ) m E e; 
5 9 92w A- E wm - A 8 . -a 
J., 
M. '. in 9 9 
2 
3 m 
ý: 
1*9e 
ýN ... -9 , -0 2 . i. -, 
1 
18-2 M0 -, n 
m 
r_ E r. Ei 
IM 
U PQ '. 43 0 S. m 
rD 
' .9, r) 1 -ý 
M 2 
r 'A 
Ue 
Iti Ici 1 Iti ý -u 
1 rz r, 44 1 Ei 
2 
p> e 
m 
M 
2. 
-a JA 
U 
.5 - 4. c2 1 1 ýN 
bl) 
Iri :1 25 
ý 
Ei 
N5 ja 8 4 4. 
m 
' ý t 
1 
3 - 
l 
Z 
jl, 
:10 
>m zý r: 92. m M c2. im s. 
9 
. Ei 
ci < :a >E >0 :A0 
- 
3g gý : D5 g 
2 0% tr e 
21 
Z4. Z2 MSPCfor Batch Process Monitoring 
In continuous processes, the data to be processed is a two-way array, X(IxJ), where J 
is the number of variables and I the observations. In batch processes, for each variable at 
each observation, since its values correspond to a trajectory spanning the whole batch run (or 
campaign), the data to be analysed is a three-way array X(IxJxK), where J is the number of 
variables measured at K time intervals throughout a batch, and I is the number of batch runs. 
The MSPC was adapted to such three-way data by Nomikos and MacGregor (1994,1995) 
using the multi-way PCA technique developed by Wold et al. (1987). Figure 2.5 depicts the 
procedure. Table 2.2 gives a summary of the publications on multi-way PCA for batch 
process studies. 
Fig. 2.5. Unfolding of three-dimensional data array and multi-way PCA. 
These studies have focused on the following issues: 
(1) A practical problem with on-line monitoring using MSPC to batch processes is that 
when a batch process is in progress the measurements for the future time periods are 
unknown, and this means that the new data set is incomplete. To monitor a new batch 
at the current time, one must replace future observations with appropriate values, such 
that the predicted scores at each time will be as close as possible to those that would be 
calculated if the complete trajectories were available. Nomikos and MacGregor (1994) 
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assumed that the future deviations of the observations from the mean trajectory remain 
constant at their current values, for the rest of the batch run. Louwerse and Smilde 
(2000) developed a different method. The method divides the total run time K of a batch 
process into several time periods according to scheduling points so that each section can 
be treated separately. Rinnar et al. (1998) presented a method, which does not require 
estimates of the future data. The approach is based on a recursive hierarchical or multi- 
block PCA or PLS algorithm which processes the data in sequential manner. 
(2) Because the original method and its later extensions were mainly based on simulated 
case studies, researchers and industrial practitioners have been very interested in 
applying them to industrial problems. A number of papers have been published which 
led to interesting findings. For example, in industrial processes, the batch lengths can be 
different from batch to batch runs. 
(3) The way of unfolding the data has also attracted interests. In the original multi-way 
PCA, the three way data X(IxlxK) was unfolded to a two-way data X(IxIK). Later 
various other methods for unfolding the data were proposed, such as the parallel factor 
(PARAFAC) (Wise et al., 1999) and Tucker3 (Tucker, 1966; Claus and Rasmus, 1998). 
Louwerse and Smilde (2000) compared the various methods and concluded that their 
performance depends on the type of fault occurring in the batch process. 
(4) Some researchers have studied the method for variable contribution analysis in multi- 
way PCA and found that the relative importance of variables varies at different stages of 
a batch run (Dong and McAvoy, 1996b, Kosanovich, Dahl and Piovoso, 1996). 
(5) Yuan and Wang (2001) emphasised the importance of monitoring batch operations 
according to stages and developed a wavelet method for automatically identifying 
stages. A rule-based method was also proposed in the study. 
Z 4.3 Other Developments in PC4 Based Process Monitoring 
Many researchers have pointed out that PCA is a linear operation. This has stimulated 
study on non-linear principal component analysis. Kramer (1991) proposed to use auto- 
associative neural networks as a non-linear PCA method. Dong and McAvoy (1996a) 
developed an alternative non-linear PCA method using the concept of principal curves. 
Wang (1999) indicated that while both methods are able to reduce the dimension of the 
original data effectively, the principal components obtained are still correlated or 
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dependent. This is unlike linear PCA in which the PCs are known to be linearly un- 
correlated. 
(2) Multi-scale PCA. Bakshi (1998) proposed the idea of integration of wavelets with PCA 
to analyse signals in multi-scales. 
(3) Multi-level PCA. Yuan and Wang (2001) have developed a multi-level PCA method, 
which makes use of rules. 
Kosanovich et al. (1996) used multi-way principal component analysis to improve 
batch process understanding and to identify the major sources of variability of process data. 
Recently, Tates et al. (1999) presented an application of the method. They use multivariate 
statistical process control charts to monitor a PVC batch process on-line. Louwerse and 
Smilde (2000) focus on the decomposition of batch process data with three dimension to 
propose three different models: Unfold-PCA, PARAFAC and Tucher3 and compare these 
models. 
2.5 Supervised and Unsupervised Neural Networks 
Neural networks (NNs) have also been widely studied in process fault diagnosis. NNs 
can be broadly divided into two types, i. e., supervised and unsupervised. A supervised NN 
requires training data from which a non-linear mapping model is learned to map the 
symptoms of faults to sources of faults. Unsupervised neural networks do not need training 
data. They group process operational data into classes corresponding to normal and abnormal 
operational zones only based on symptoms. 
Z5.1 Supervised Neural Networks 
The most widely studied supervised NN is the error back-propagation neural network 
(BPNN). Simply speaking, BPNN is an algorithm or software system, which can learn from 
data the non-linear relationships between multiple inputs and outputs, without requiring 
specific information on the fundamental mechanisms relating them. The learning mimics the 
human learning process through continuously correcting the errors. A BPNN is made up of 
interconnected computational processing elements called neurons which process input 
information and give outputs. The neurons are divided into layers. A typical three- . layer 
BPNN consists of an input layer representing the input variables, an output layer 
corresponding to the output variables and a hidden layer (Fig. 2-6). Neurons between two 
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adjacent layers are fully connected by branches. Attached to each branch there is a weight 
reflecting the strength of the connections. The training (or learning) of the network involves 
finding the connection weights, which minimise the sum of squares of difference between 
the network outputs and the target values: 
MN 
E=EZ(t(m)-yým))2 
... Iz M=l 1-1 
(2.3) 
Where M- Number of training data patterns 
N- Number of neurons in the output layer 
The target value of the ith output neuron for the given mth data pattern 
The prediction for the ith output neuron given the mth data pattern 
The BPNN learning process involves a forward propagation pass calculating the 
outputs using the inputs, weights and neuron transfer functions, as well as a back- 
propagation pass correcting the weights using the error between predictions and target 
values. The major advantage of a BPNN model is its ability to learn from data without 
requiring principle knowledge of domain problems. In addition it is very effective in dealing 
with a large amount of data. The structure of a BPNN model can be easily constructed 
according the domain problem and availability of data attributes. 
Fig. 2.6. A three layered back propagation neural network. 
As one of the earliest applications of BPNN in process fault diagnosis, Hoskins and 
Himmelblau (1988) studied six types of faults using a process consisting of three CSTRs in 
series. Venkatasubramanian et al. (1990) investigated some fundamental issues using a more 
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complex process. Hoskins et al. (199 1) studied 19 types of faults using a process having 418 
measurements. Kramer and Leonard (1990) made a useful analysis on use of BPNN in 
process fault diagnosis and introduced radial basis function network. Ungar et al. (1990) 
looked at the application of adaptive networks to fault detection and adaptive control. They 
used two neural networks, one for fault diagnosis and one for the controller. The connection 
strengths for the models represented by the correlation between inputs such as alarms and 
sensor measurements and the outputs such as faults and action, which are learned using rules 
and the back-propagation algorithm. The outcome of the system is a pattern recogniser, 
which learns non-linearly for controlling simple process, and to learn the logical 
relationships between the alarm and measurements with faults as well as their linear 
correlations. Farell and Roat (1994) proposed a framework for enhancing neural network 
performance in fault diagnosis, which could also be described as an elementary classification 
(clustering) technique. The network is trained using not the actual values of variables, but 
normalised distances from normal operation values. Improved performance was observed. 
An unsolved problem is how to determine the threshold value, which specifies the size of 
each cluster. Sridhar and Seagrave (1996) came up with a methodology of combining 
different neural models by using stacked generalisation. It attempts to solve the problem of 
model selection and model combination simultaneously, to improve model predictions. The 
drawback of this approach is the increased computational time. Zhang at al. (1997) used the 
same principle but the purpose was to build a neural soft sensor for quality prediction in a 
polyrnerisation reactor. Lennox et al. (1998) employed the artificial neural networks in two 
practical applications. The first application was modelling verification process using real 
process data (Verification is a process that encapsulates highly active liquid waste in glass to 
provide a safe and convenient method of storage). The second application employed the 
neural network to capture non-linear system characteristics and then recalled to provide a 
means of detecting imminent failure of a vessel in the same verification process. Because 
real data is employed, the method is limited to a number of known failures therefore needs 
further training for new conditions. Simani and Fantuzzi (2000) developed a fault diagnosis 
methodology consisting of two stages. In the first stage the fault is detected on the basis of 
the residuals generated from a bank of Kalman filters, while in the second stage, fault 
identification is obtained from pattern recognition techniques implemented by a neural 
network. Comparative study was carried out using a three-layered radial basis function 
network and a back-propagation neural network. It was found that the radial basis function 
did not perform satisfactorily. 
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Wang (1999) indicated that supervised neural networks have two major limitations in 
fault diagnosis. The first problem is that it is not an effective method for identification of 
abnormal operations. Some researchers used neural networks trained with normal operational 
data to identify faults: if the output is not in the normal region then abnormal operation is 
expected. The second and most important limitation of supervised neural networks is that 
training data is not readily available. It is unthinkable to initiate faults in a real plant in order 
to get training data. Many researchers have proposed to use dynamic simulators to generate 
the necessary training data. These limitations make supervised neural networks less 
attractive in fault identification and diagnosis compared with unsupervised neural networks. 
Z5.2 Unsupervised Neural Networks 
To distinguish supervised and various unsupervised NNs, it is useful to make a 
detailed classification of the data that is used. Table 2.3 listed four types of data and the 
types of neural networks that can be used to solve the classification problem. The most 
important advantage of unsupervised NNs compared with supervised NNs is that they do not 
need training data. They classify the operation of a process into normal and abnormal 
operations only based on the assessment of the measurements. 
Table 2.3. Types of data and neural networks. 
Types of neural 
Types of data networks 
_ part of the database is known, i. e., the number and descriptions of Supervised NNs, e. g. 
classes as well as the assignments of individual data patterns are known. back-propagation NN 
lie task is to assign unknown data patterns to the established classes. (BPNN) 
Both the number and descriptions of classes are known, but the Unsupcrýiscd NNs, 
assigniment of individual data patterns is not known. Tbc task is then to e. g., Kohonen (1982) 
assign all data atterns to the known classes. 
'Me number of classes is known but the descriptions and the assignment Unsupervised NNs, 
of individual data patterns are not known. The problem is to develop a e. g., Kohonen (1982) 
description for each class and assign all data patterns to them. 
Both the number and descriptions of classes are not known and it is Unsupervised NNs, 
necessary to determine the number and descriptions of classes as well as e. g., adaptive resonance 
the assignments of the data patterns. I theory (ART-2) 
Whiteley and Davis (1994) and Whiteley et al. (1996) studied the adaptive resonance 
theory (ART2) developed by Grossberg (1976ab) and Carpenter and Grossberg (1987, 
1988) for the purpose of process fault diagnosis. In addition to being an unsupervised 
technique, ART2 is also recursive, or in the terms used in ART2, it is plastic, that is able to 
acquire new knowledge and retain stable in the sense that existing knowledge is not 
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corrupted. This property is apparently very useful for on-line monitoring where information 
is received continuously and the model can be continuously improved. 
Chen et al. (1999) and Wang et al. (1999) found that ART2 is very sensitive to noises 
and to the threshold value; therefore they developed a new method called ARTnet, which 
uses wavelets to replace the signal pre-processing element of ART2. ARTnet proves to be 
robust to noise and the threshold values, and faster than ART2. 
Kohonen network (1982) has also been studied for fault detection and diagnosis 
(Chowdhury and Wang, 1996). The difference of Kohonen network from ART2 and ARTnet 
is that it needs the number of classes to be determined before learning starts. 
2.6 Other Methods 
2.6.1 Data Pre-Processing 
Data pre-processing has the following purposes, 
(1) Filtering out the noise components otherwise this may result in wrong conclusions being 
reached from the data. On-line measurements are characterised by noises and 
uncertainties. At high noise to signal ratio, the real trend of variables and the process 
cannot be clearly identified. 
(2) Extracting features, reducing the dimensionality of the original signal and retain as 
much relevant information as possible. The main reasons for feature extraction are, first 
of all to minimise the dependencies between attributes and secondly to reduce 
dimensionality. 
Dealing with the problem of variable sampling periods for data, such as on-line real 
time signals and laboratory analytical data. 
Qualitative interpretation of measurements, for the purpose of expert systems and 
qualitative reasoning. 
Although techniques for noise removal and data reconciliation exist, some new 
techniques have been developed in recent years, which are more effective than the traditional 
methods in handling noise and uncertainty in data. More importantly these techniques can be 
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used for qualitative interpretation, feature extraction and dimension reduction of dynamic 
trend signals. 
Z 6. LI Qualitative Interpretation 
The most notable method for qualitative interpretation of dynamic trend signals is the 
episode method, which was originally developed by William (1986). Janusz and 
Venkatasubramanian (1991) adapted the method and produce nine primitives to represent 
any plots of a function, as shown in Fig. 2.7. Each primitive consists of the signs and the first 
and second derivatives of the function. This means, each primitive possesses information 
about whether the function is positive or negative, increasing, decreasing, or not changing, 
and the concavity. An episode is an interval described by only one primitive and the time 
interval the episode spans. A trend is a series of episodes that when grouped together can 
completely describe the qualitative states of the system. C and D in Fig. 2.7 are actually not 
primitives because they can be regarded as the combination of A, F and B, E. Therefore they 
can be reduced to seven primitives as shown in Fig. 2.8. 
r- 
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Fig. 2.7. Nine primitives used in episode approach. 
A combination of episodes will form a trend over an interval and is described by a 
primitive and the associated time. Primitives are different for first and/or second order 
derivatives, so the distinguishing points between episode segments are the extrema and 
inflexions where 
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Fig. 2.8. The seven primitives episodes. 
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The task of identifying the episodes from a signal is simply to identify the inflexions; 
and/or extrema, i. e., singularities in the signal since they correspond to distinct points of the 
episode segments. This means that the singularities of a signal contain the most important 
information about the trend. Using singularities for feature representation therefore 
completely defines the episodes characteristics of a signal. 
However, the singularities are strongly influenced by noise and this is the major 
weakness of this approach. Noise components must be identified and filtered from the 
features; otherwise the representation will be misleading. Bakshi and Stephanopoulos (1994 
a&b) used the wavelet approach to simultaneously remove the noise components and 
automatically identify the inflection points. 
Wang and Li (1999) developed a different approach for qualitative representation of 
dynamic trends using principal component analysis. The main advantage of the method is 
that it can qualitatively describe a dynamic trend using only a single qualitative value, 
without the need to beak the trend into segments. 
Z 6.1.2 Feature Extraction and Dimension Reduction 
There are two aspects in dimension reduction of process dynamic trends: feature 
extraction from a trend of an individual variable and removal of dependencies among a 
number of correlated and sometimes redundant variables. The former is concerned with 
using minimum number of values, called features to represent a trend. Wavelets (Bakshi and 
Stephanopoulos, 1994 (a&b); Chen et al., 1999; Chen, 1998) have been studied for this 
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purpose. The methods of episodes (Janusz and Venkatasubramanian, 1991; Cheung and 
Stephanopoulos, 1990) and principal component analysis (Wang and Li, 1999) can also be 
considered as belonging to this category. The later is aimed at removing the dependencies 
among variables so that the process can be monitored in a reduced dimensional space. The 
most notable method for this purpose is principal component analysis (PCA) (MacGregor 
and Kourti, 1995). 
Z6.2 Hybrid Methods 
There are also research interests in integration of different techniques. Examples 
include integration of expert systems and neural networks (e. g., Ozyurt and Kandel, 1996), 
fia, zy logic with neural networks (e. g., Zhao at al., 1997; Wang et al., 1997), and fuzzy logic 
with graphical methods (Shih and Lee, 1995; Han et al., 1994; Wang et al., 1995). 
26.3 Graphical Methods 
The most well studied graphical method for process fault diagnosis is signed digraphs 
(SDG). SDG is attractive because of its ability to translate the complex inter-relationships 
between process variables into an easily understood form and make a complex problem 
traceable. In relation to development of a new graphical method for fault diagnosis in ajoint 
process - operator system, a detailed literature review will be made in chapter 6. 
2.7 Human Factors in Process Operational Safety 
As has been addressed earlier that operators are an integral part of modem computer 
control systems who are responsible for assessing process operational status and take 
corrective actions when he/or she perceives that things may go wrong. Human factors in 
process operational safety (Mill, 1992; Redmill and Rajan 1997) are concerned with what 
happens when the operator receives information, reviews it against his/her experience and 
feeds back to the operation. Many things may go wrong at the interface between the 
operator and the process. For example the operator's observation may be faulty, assessment 
on the situation may be wrong and the feedback or action may commit failure and cause 
more faults in the process. 
A according to a survey conducted by a consortium led by Honeywell around the 
world including UK, USA, Canada, Europe and Japan, about 40% of abnormal operation 
were caused by the human errors (Nimmo, 1995). However as indicated by Health and 
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Safety Executive (UK), there is only limited information on how human factors can be 
assessed and even less that is specific to chemical engineering. There are two main methods 
which, have been used to address human factors in process safety, i. e., training and human- 
machine interactions. 
Z 7.1 Operator Training using Computer Based Systems 
Traditionally operator training has been based on on-site learning and practising. More 
recently, computer based training systems have been widely used. The most widely used 
technique is using training simulators. On a dynamic training simulator, operators learn to 
identify abnormal operations and observe systems responses to faults and corrective actions, 
as well as learn start-up and shutdown procedures. Since various faults can be easily initiated 
and the dynamic response time is much shorter than in a real plant, operators can experience 
more operational scenarios in weeks on a training simulator than in the real plant in months 
to years. 
Knowledge based expert systems can also be used for training operators (Su and Lin, 
1997). Emergency management of chemical spills was employed to exemplify the rule based 
decision task. Expert systems were used as the training tool for 40 students who were asked 
to resolve spill scenixios under the manipulation of training and deadline conditions. 
The function of operator training systems can be greatly enhanced with the use of 
multimedia technologies including 3D motion pictures, sound effects and interactive 
communications (Goh et al., 1998). 
Research on human factors often considers one human user interacting with the 
machine. In practice, it often involves several operators working together and 
communicating between each other. Goal setting and goal sharing are important 
prerequisites for co-operative work. Elliot and Entin (1999) developed a team training 
procedure designed to train teams to adapt by shifting from explicit to implicit modes 
coordination and choosing strategies that are appropriate during period of high stress and 
workload condition. The result of their study indicated that several underlying team process 
measures exhibited pattern indicating that adaptive training improved various team 
processes, including efficient use of mental models, which in turn improve performance. 
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2 7.2 Addressing Human Factor Issues at the Design Stage 
Human errors can also be introduced to safety check procedures during the process 
design stage, such as the symbolic model verification procedure, haza d and operability 
studies (Kletz, 1999; Lees, 1996), and process simulation (Moon et al., 1997; Probst et al., 
1997; and Dimitriadis et al., 1995). In these procedures, modes of operator activities are 
needed. 
Z 7.3 Reliability Modelling and Risk Simulation of Operators 
With the increasing awareness of the importance of human factors in operational 
system safety, human reliability assessment (HRA) is gaining increasing attention 
(Broadbent et al., 1990). Early work attempted to evaluate the probability of human 
erroneous actions such as the method developed by Swain and Guttman (1983), which was 
known as the Technique for Human Error Rate Prediction (THERP) and regarded as the first 
generation of HRA methods. THERP is a schematic representation of human actions and 
related system events, the so-called HRA Event Tree. The drawback of THERP method is 
that it does not include a consideration of the dynamic cognitive factors that effect operator's 
behaviour. The development of a second generation of HRA methods (Dougherty, 1990, 
1991) failed to overcome the drawback of THERP due to failure to provide a proper 
treatment of human cognition. Consequently the natural evolution of the human reliability 
assessment approaches led to attempts to solve the problem of HRA in terms of the 
Reliability of Cognition (Hollnagel, 1991). These solutions account for dynamic effects of 
endogenous and exogenous factors on the inappropriate decision-making and actions 
(Cacciabue et al., 1993; Cacciabue, 1998; Roth et al., 1991). In parallel to the evolution of 
the HRA methods, the taxonomies dedicated to human erroneous behaviour have also 
gradually modified their focus from the simple omission/commission alternative to more 
structured taxonomies of work environment based on cognitive analysis (Norman, 1981; 
Rasmussen et al., 1981; Reason, 1990). These approaches for the study of the reliability of 
cognition need to be coupled to appropriate taxonomies accounting for the socio-technical 
factors of the working environment (Bagnara et al., 1991) and for well-structured definitions 
of causes, or genotypes and manifestations, or phenotypes and consequences of human 
erroneous actions (Hollnagel, 1993,1996). Yoshikawa and Wu (1999) developed a 
framework for estimating Human Error Probability, which is used for HRA. The approach 
relies on the comparison between the experimental data and human model simulation, an 
estimated human cognitive reliability curves are used to confirm the applicability of human 
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model for estimating these human error probability parameters. Vanderhaegen (2001) 
developed a method called ACIH, a French acronym for analysis consequences of human 
unreliability. The method aimed at identifying both tolerable and intolerable sets of human 
behavioural degradation, which may affect the system safety. 
The limitations of human reliability approaches are no greater than the equivalent 
limitations of the system reliability approaches, which is that the lack of cognitive or human 
modelling accuracy is no more of a drawback than the lack of deterministic physical 
analysis, typical of a fault-tree approach, in performing the reliability analysis of the system. 
However the drawback of HRA methods mainly falls within modelling and simulation of the 
human behaviour such as human planning and decision and human-machine interaction such 
as dynamic and time dependent nature of interaction. Johnson (1999) discussed the barriers 
to the practical application of human error analysis and explained why the human error 
modelling failed to help in systems development. Human behaviour modelling is also 
employed in other applications such as design of interface (Johannsen, 1995,1997; Yoon 
and Kim, 1996; Nishitani et al., 2000) and operational procedures (Grant and Mayes, 1991; 
Moray et al., 1992). 
2.8 Conclusions and Final Remarks 
Over the last fifteen years significant progress has been made in research in applying 
artificial intelligence techniques to process monitoring and fault diagnosis. This chapter has 
reviewed some of these including real-time expert systems, univariate and multivariate 
statistical process control, supervised and unsupervised neural networks as well as data pre- 
processing techniques and graphical methods. In the review, the focus has been put on 
examining the advantages and limitations of various methods rather than exhausting the 
literature. To make a clearer and more concise comparison of some of these methods, Table 
2.4 gives a summary. 
Apart from the comments made on individual methods in the above review, we also 
have the following observations. Firstly, there is a need to benchmark the techniques in 
industrial applications. Although there have been comparisons of various methods in 
literature, they often are qualitative and not comprehensive. Secondly, the methods need to 
be integrated with modem computer control systems. This has just started, for example, 
some DCS control systems now provide fault detection and diagnosis programs as standard 
configuration modules. However, it has not become a routine practice. Furthermore, with 
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extensive use of these methods, the need to improve existing techniques and seek more 
effective methods will arise. 
Table 2.4. Comparison of various methods for fault identification and diagnosis. 
Techniques Advantages Disadvantages 
Real-time Knowledge is transparent and causal I luman experts knowledge is subjective 
expert Can give explanations to Why and How Unable to learn from data therefore not able 
system Rules can be wily added and removed to automatically improve performance during 
Can be considered as a principle use 
knowledge based method Causal mlationship can be buried in a large 
Human experts experience and knowledge knowledge base 
can be stored and used Difficult to maintain and inconsistency may 
occur in a large database 
Lack of statistical basis because data is not 
used. 
Can have difficulty in describing system 
having strong inunction of variables 
Qualitative interpretation of measurements 
cause loss of information 
Multivariate MSPC is a data driven method Human expest's knowledge can not be used 
Statistical Principle model Is not needed Principle knowledge can not be incorporated 
Process Has a statistical basis into the system 
Control Well developed Need a large amount of historical data 
(MSPC) Knowledge is opaque 
Supervised Supervised NNs are data driven Require training data of fault -symptom 
Neural approaches pairs, which is often not available 
Networks Principle model is not needed Human expcrVs knowledge can not be used 
(NNs) Well developed and easy to be trained Principle knowledge is often not used 
Knowledge is opaque 
Unsupervise Unsupervised NNs am data driven Not as well developed as supervised NNs 
d Neural approaches Knowledge is opaque 
Networks Principle model is not needed Human expert's knowledge can not be used 
Do not need training data Principle knowledge is not used 
Signed a useful tool for qualitative, causal and Being a qualitative method 
digraphs fust principle analysis drawing a SDG for a process involving strong 
(SDG) represent a cotnplex problem in a causal interactions of variables and control loops can 
and traceable way be difficult. 
System's overall causal relationship can Not a data driven approach 
be visualised Qualitative interpretation of measurements 
cause loss of information 
In almost all the above-reviewed methods, it has assumed that after a fault occurring, 
the process will evolve without intervention of operators. For example, dynamic simulation 
systems have been widely used in developing and testing fault detection and diagnosis 
systems. The simulators only emulate the process's behavior under disturbances or faults, 
without considering operators possible interventions during the dynamic transition of the 
process. The dynamic behaviour of the process clearly will be different and more complex if 
operators intervene during the process of system evolvement. Most of the studies on 
operator's factors in systems operational safety have been in other industries such as the 
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nuclear and air space, rather than chemical industries. These studies have been focused on 
stress and behaviour models of operators and the purpose has been on improving 
management culture, working environment such as light and operational procedures. They 
have not been linked to development of computer aided fault detection and diagnosis 
systems. 
A further observation is that all the studies on automatic fault detection and diagnosis 
have focused on only part of the integrated dynamic system, i. e., the process part. No effort 
has yet been made on automatic monitoring and assessing the other part, i. e., the operators. 
This may be partly due to the difficulty associated with automatically detecting the fault 
committed by operators, but is certainly inconsistent with the statistics. According to Nimmo 
(1995), 40% of fault happened in process history was due to human factor. Lardner and 
Fleming (1999) indicated 80% of accidents involved human errors. The difference in the 
figures may have been caused by the definition on what can be called human errors (direct 
human error or process error with inappropriate reaction of operators), they all stressed the 
importance of human factors in operational process safety. However, as reviewed above, 
work so far has been restricted to training and prediction of human reliability. There has 
been no effort to develop techniques and systems that can automatically characterise, 
monitor and assess operators behaviour and actions in operation. 
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Chapter 3 
The Joint Process-Operator Simulation System 
This chapter describes the role and implementation issues of the joint process- 
operator simulation system. 
3.1 Introduction 
Data, information and communication are very important to the analysis of the human- 
machine interactions. In the chemical and allied industries, it will take years to collect 
sufficient data and then catalogue them for the human-machine behaviour study. The 
collected data, from which, the accidentslincidents have been experienced by human 
operators, only covers events that have happened and reported. There are still plenty of 
unexpected errors in plant design, operations, human or equipment. Hence, other scenarios, 
which have not happened, may happen. To overcome this deficiency, it is advantageous to 
develop a computer-based system, which can generate data and information in a very short 
time to cover most of the possible events lurking in the process plants waiting to materialise. 
In fact, this computer-based system should also be able to catalogue, analyse, communicate 
and predict the human-machine interactions readily. 
For this proposes, a joint process-operator simulation system to carry out all analyses, 
interaction and model development is developed in this chapter. The system is used as the 
main tool to generate the training data to be used in Chapter 6, validation data in Chapter 7, 
human behaviour data in Chapter 4; and to develop the process and human behaviour 
qualitative models in Chapters 4 and 6. It is also used to monitor the process and human 
behaviour (Chapters 4 and 5), undertake data analysis (Chapters 4 and 7), and evaluate the 
developed models (Chapter 7). The system development and testing are based on a joint 
simulation framework for human-process interactions. The operator's performance is 
modelled as a knowledge-based system, which is a collection of rules representing the skills 
of operators in perception and interpretation of on-line signals, and the subsequent planning 
and sequence of actions. Moreover, a CSTR dynamic training simulator generates data of the 
process behaviour. One of the objectives of the joint system is to develop a framework for 
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analysing the operational records in detail and to study the proposed human factor studies. In 
the case of human factor studies, special attention will focus on the human errors in 
operational process safety in an attempt to identify the good and bad behaviour and 
performance of both process and personal operation. The generic knowledge can be used to 
improve the operator's skills, design process of equipment and control systems, develop 
decision support system and carry out hazard and operability and reliability studies. 
In order to develop a framework that can provide guidelines and support the above 
analyses, it is important to start by illustrating some basic concepts and definitions that 
generically characterise the human-machine interaction system. Therefore, in Section 3.2, 
the outline of a classical architecture for proccss-operator interaction and simulation of 
cognition is given. To define the structure and the functions of the developed system, several 
types of process-operator interaction systems used for simulation, analysis and application 
are investigated in Section 3.3. In Section 3.4, the architecture of the proposed process- 
operator interaction system is detailed. Finally, the conclusive remarks are made in Section 
3.5. 
3.2 The Joint Human-Machine Interaction System 
Human-machine interactions always occur in a realistic context, which is 
characterised by the machine under control, the socio-technical working environment and by 
the operator in-direct contact with the process. The plant interacts with the operator through 
its interface, i. e. display panels, indicators, and decision support tools. The socio-technical 
working conditions, such as the context and environment, influence the human behaviour. 
These conditions comprise: 
(1) The actual environment such as noise, space, light, temperature, etc. in the operation 
place. 
(2) Other operators cooperating directly or collaborating at distance with the decision 
maker. 
(3) The whole social context represented by the management, the company, the society, and 
the cultural climate. 
The process interface and socio-technical working conditions are the main source of 
incentive for the operator. They affect the allocation of the resources (i. e. data and 
information) and knowledge base. They may modify the unfolding of the reasoning and 
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cognitive processes, as well as the performances of manual. or control actions, for examples, 
causing error or inappropriate behaviour, or altering the amount of knowledge accessible to 
the human in a given circumstance. Therefore, the human-machine interaction system must 
include an interaction model, so that the system will be able to account for other aspects of 
the interaction, such as dynamic features, human errors, component failures, control panel 
and display units, and working environment. Therefore the joint system requires an 
interaction model to carry out the above functions and data architecture model for managing 
the data that supports the simulation and permits the interaction model to manage the data 
exchange between all human-machine interaction systems. A typical architecture of a 
human-machine interaction system is shown in Fig. 3.1. The system is compromised of a 
number of models linked to dynamic memory to allow a fast and bi-directional data flow 
between the system models. 
An efficient interaction (i. e. easy but fast data, information and knowledge exchange) 
between the data architecture and the interaction models must be established since all 
knowledge and information. The types of disturbances influence the operator behaviour 
regarding the overall joint system required by the interaction model is stored in the data 
architecture model. For example, in order to let the operator model to take an action or 
decision in an accident situation, the data architecture model will provide all knowledge and 
information, such as the type and mode of error, the type of component failure, level of 
operator stress and expertise, amount of information available for the operator by the support 
system, etc., required by the interaction model to carry out the accident scenarios. The 
operator model will produce a number of actions or procedures during the accident to 
represent his/her own behaviour, which will be recorded by the joint system. The operator 
behaviour will be analysed and assessed also by the interaction model. As a result, new 
knowledge and information will be created and used to update and modify the existed 
knowledge and information, which are located in the data architecture model. The new 
information is used to create new scenarios under accident situation, rules and facts related to 
operator and process, and models to represent the behaviours of both operator and process. 
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Figure 3.2 shows a general architecture proposed by Cacciabue (1998). It was 
developed for all prospective analysis, which is mainly concerned with analytical description 
of the plant behaviour. A human model is linked directly to the machine model, i. e., a human 
action is executed directly by the machine model without any filtering from the interaction 
model. The information of the entire content of an incident without filtering is vital to safety 
analyses. There are no bi-directional links between the interaction and human models (i. e. 
Fig. 3.2 shows one way arrows therefore data flow in one direction only) because the human 
behaviour is determined by the human model and not by the interaction model. The joint 
system (Fig. 3.2) must be initialised at time zero (t--O) with an accident or event, i. e., either a 
human erroneous action or a system failure, or both. Then the process model produces 
responses to represent the plant behaviour and control mechanisms over a certain time period 
(At). These will combine the internal/external conditions to produce human error modes and 
new system failures. The operator model calculates the human behaviour and ends the loop 
of the interaction. A new configuration of the control setting, system failures and human 
action is defined and new time integration (t--t+At) can be calculated. The main drawback of 
this system is that limited to safety assessment application only and not for improving the 
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-Re- 
40 
system design such as operation procedures, computer interface, and fault diagnosis, and for 
accident analysis. The system also needs to be initiated in every new safety analysis case 
with appropriate initial conditions. Further more the accuracy of dynamic and time 
dependent nature of the interaction is not known. 
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Fig. 3.2. Architecture of human-machine interaction simulation (Cacclabue, 1998). 
Kazuo et al. (1999) developed a simulation system known as operator crew cognitive 
simulation (OCCS) (Fig. 33), where interactions exist between the operators and 
environment, and among the operators. The operator information is obtained from the 
environment and other operator, or agent, in addition to its own knowledge. The simulation 
system is used to see to what extent these interactions are relevant for operator crew 
performance, and whether the simulation of operator crew performance is useful in human- 
machine system design. Fig. 3.3 also shows the massage transfer sub module, which controls 
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the flow of bi-directional messages "changed between the interface simulation, plant 
simulation and operator simulation sub modules. 
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Fig. 3.3 Operator crew cognitive simulation architecture (OCCS) (Kazuo et al., 1999). 
The OCCS system mainly deals with the factors affecting the human behaviour, such 
as the performance of a group of operators during the operation. Although this type ofjoint 
interaction system will be useful for theoretical study in improving the operator crew 
communication, designing control panels and designing a large control room where the 
operation depend on a number of operators, the result of any of these studies is not reliable 
because an accurate model for human cooperation behaviour cannot be developed since the 
mentality and the background of each operator are different. For example, the team 
cooperation is a function of stress level, operator confidence, operator training, etc. (Entin et 
al., 1999). The limitation of the system is mainly derived from its limited application to 
operator crew performance and design of human machine system cooperation. Therefore, the 
system is not capable to improve the operation procedures, the fault diagnosis, the decision 
support system and the safety analysis. 
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Nevertheless, a compromise between the Cacciabue (1998) system and that of Kazuo 
et al. (1999) could produce a more reliable system, which can be used for prospective 
analysis, such as the evaluation of data, parameter and probabilistic related to human actions 
and decisions, and retrospective analysis, such as events and fundamental reasons and facts 
that promote certain human behaviour during operation. To develop the process-operator 
system as illustrated in Fig. 3.1 for both retrospective and prospective analyses, the 
requirement and the specification of each element in the system must be set as follows: 
(1) Human behaviour model and simulation can be represented by the basic cognitive 
function such as perception, interpretation, planning and execution. These cognitive 
functions can be implemented using engineering methods of detection, diagnosis and 
action, such as the mathematical theory of communication (Shannon and Weaver, 
1949), the theory of signal detection (Peterson et al., 1954) and linear control theory 
(McRuer and Krendel, 1957), and engineering methods of planning and decision 
making such as ftizzy set theory and mathematics (Zadeh, 1965), qualitative physic 
theory (De Kleer and Brown, 1984), artificial intelligence (Cohen and Feigenbaum, 
1986), and expert systems (Alty and Guida, 1985). The human model also requires rule 
and knowledge base to describe procedure and to support the cognitive function. 
(2) Machine behaviour can be modelled using sets of analytical and differential equations 
translated to a computer programme as a dynamic simulator. The dynamic simulator 
should emulate the dynamic behaviour of the process under various operational modes 
and continuously send information of alarm status and variable values to the system. 
Example of human-machine systems includes the simulation of context and working 
environment in the machine model (Cacciabue, 1999) and the -context and working 
environment in the interaction model (Kazuo et al., 1999). 
(3) Interaction model and simulation can be implemented using logic algorithms, analytical 
expression, statistical techniques and rule and knowledge bases, which can deal with the 
requirement of the system such as time management, reliability and systematic safety 
analysis, forming sequences and exchange of data and messages. The logical and 
numerical algorithms or analytical expressions manage the correlation of failure and 
error modes and types. The statistical methods or rule-based approaches are useful in 
probabilities and frequencies of occurrences and uncertainty bounds. 
(4) Data architecture elements can be implemented through data classification according to 
their physical, structural and mathematical features and by a speciric body of data, such 
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as the database and knowledge base, which support the simulation of human, plant and 
environment. 
3.3 Simulation, Analysis and Application Types of Joint Human- 
Machine Systems 
Simulation of system behaviour can be broadly divided into two types, i. e., qualitative 
and quantitative simulations. Qualitative simulation explains qualitatively how process- 
operator interaction occurs by describing the structure, the links and the logical and dynamic 
evolution of cognitive process. Quantitative simulation is the computational part of the 
system simulation as well as the numerical estimation of the human behaviour. It is 
necessary that all quantitative simulation performed in parallel. There are a number of 
reasons using simulation study instead of real practice study, such as, the access to 
simulation is much easier and much faster; simulation can be controlled, i. e., can be stopped 
at any point and restarted from the same point; simulation covers wide range of situation in 
very short period; and simulation provides a structured way to the analysis of events. Two 
types of analysis can be considered in the process-operator interaction simulation. First, 
retrospective analysis is the assessment of events, such as incident and accident to identify 
the root causes that have triggered a certain human behaviour using qualitative model and 
simulation, i. e., analysis of past accident data and knowledge for root cause studies 
(evaluation of decision in accident analysis) using expert system. Second prospective 
analysis is prediction and evaluating the outcome of human action or malfunction, i. e., 
human and process behaviour evaluation studies, such as the operation reliability (Human 
Reliability and Process Reliability Assessment in Probabilistic Safety Assessment), and 
interface and procedures design. Prospective analysis is based on quantitative simulation and 
requires probability and expectation of human and machine behaviour, i. e., statistical 
mathematics. The applications of analysis and simulation of cognition are: 
(1) Design purpose aims at developing and evaluation of procedures and interface (Degani 
and Wiener, 1994; Nishitani et al., 2000; Beka Be Nguema, 2000) and improving 
communication and control design (Johannsen, 1997). Different procedures, interfaces, 
control and decision support systems can be designed, compared and tested using 
different initial and boundary conditions derived from the normal and abnormal plant 
conditions made by the operators. Design is a typical application of prospective analysis 
using quantitative numerical simulations since various operator behaviours are used to 
determine a number of designs. 
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(2) The safety assessment purpose aims at evaluating the probabilities associated with 
certain accidents, their consequences and frequencies of occurrence, in relation to 
predefined selection of initiating events. These events are represented by a combination 
of structure of classes or levels of erroneous, reliability data and error/failure 
probabilities and reliability methods for human and hardware/software system 
(Hollnagel, 1993). A process model is required in this application to describe the 
machine response, which will be used in process reliability assessment; and the human 
actions, which will be used in human reliability analysis (Cacciabue, 1998; Yoshikawa 
and Wu, 1999), which is to predict human error rates; and to evaluate the degradation to 
human machine system likely to be caused by human errors in association with 
equipment function, operational procedures and practice which affect the system 
behaviour. Therefore, the safety assessment is a combination of human reliability 
analysis with process reliability assessment according to the rule of probability. The 
design basis for the accident analysis is also classified as the safety study of specific 
accidents. The designer sets the boundary and initial conditions, which represent a set of 
worse possible accident scenarios. The design of safety measure and protection devises 
of the system such as alarms, safety valves, position of fire distinguisher and 
instruction, etc., are based on the quantitative results of design basis accident analysis. 
The quantitative effect of the safety assessment can also employed in modifying the 
design of the process and the associate controller so that it deals with the considered 
events or disturbances (Dimitriadis et al., 1996). 
(3) Training human factors insight has nowadays become practice for highly specialised 
operators, such as the nuclear power plant operators, pilots and air traffic controllers. 
There are two types of human factor training: classroom and simulation training. 
Classroom human factor training covers an introduction of concepts in human 
behaviour, human-human and human-machine interactions in very specialised 
discussion and lectures, as part of the standard and recurrent training (Wiener et aL, 
1993). Simulation training is carried out during practical sessions on a full-scale 
simulator. Operators are trained in these sessions with the objective not only to develop 
their technical skill in controlling and supervising the machine during abnormal 
conditions, but also to manage and exploit human competence and potentialities at their 
best, especially when working as a team (Kazuo et al., 1999). The instructor in both 
human factor training must master the simulation of the human behaviour in order to 
describe, review and characterise different human performance. Therefore the model 
must be well constructed and descriptive in nature, as to offer a solid paradigm of 
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reference to the instructor. The most frequent application of such a model in training 
occurs when instructor has to explain punctual performances and patterns of behaviour. 
(4) Accident analysis and investigation are oriented to the identification of the root-cause of 
an accident. They are related to human errors and system failure and malfunctions, and 
to prevent the same types of accidents in future by taking preventative measures. 
Accident analysis aims at establishing the correlation between causes, effects, and 
consequences that may be recurrent within the system at all levels, and have contributed 
to the sequence of events. From the human analysis viewpoint a method for accident 
analysis require a models of cognitive process, which leads to classification schemes 
that categorise the observed behaviour. A framework representation of the dynamics of 
events and human-machine interactions is required where dependences, contextual 
occurrences and logical links are accounted for. 
3.4 The Proposed Architecture of the Process and Operator Joint 
Simulation System 
Figure 3.4 shows the overall architecture of the proposed process and operator joint 
simulation system. The system is developed f6r the following purposes: monitoring the 
process and operator's behaviour during operation particularly when the process is under the 
affect of disturbances, developing qualitative models representing both process and operator 
behaviour, and as a tool for extracting information and knowledge from data, which will be 
used for designing decision support systems, procedures, interfaces and safety measures. 
The interaction model is one of the main elements in the joint simulation system. it is 
implemented using a number of quantitative and qualitative simulation functions linked to 
'data architecture and the graphical user interface. The types of simulation functions used in 
the interaction system are fuzzy logic and Rizzy c-means clustering, combinational logic, 
mathematical statistics, and rule and knowledge based techniques. These simulation 
functions are supported by the physical, structural and mathematical data of the data 
architecture embedded in the interaction model. There are other functions performed by the 
interaction model, such as handling the graphical user interface and data exchange within the 
interaction model. The input data to the interaction model is the operator and process 
variables, parameters and the mode and types of errors and failures exist in the data 
architecture of the interaction model. Unlike other systems, errors and failure modes and 
types exist outside the interaction model or are initiated by the user (Cacciabue, 1998). There 
are two reasons to integrate the data architecture in the interaction model, flrstly, it allows 
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the model to access the data much faster and secondly to reduce the complexity of the time 
management of the interaction model (i. e. reduction of time dependent of data structure). 
This is very beneficial since the interaction model has to deal with the data exchange 
between the process and operator models, which can be evolving continuously and 
independently. The outputs of the interaction model are the disturbances, operator's errors, 
and indicators and controller states. The interaction model receives and transmits data from 
and to the operator and process models as shown in Fig. 3.4. 
A qualitative simulator is implemented by combining rules and facts used as operator 
model. The model can represent a number of operators; each has different responses and 
behaviour to the same event or process malfunction. The operator model input is the 
indicator reading, controller status or the mode and the type of operator, such as his/her 
stress level, operator response and operator output constant. The output of the operator 
model is the action to be carried out. 
The process model imitates the dynamic behaviour of the process under various 
operational modes and continuously receives operator's action and transmits its status to the 
interaction model for carrying out the required analysis and assessment. 
The process, operator and interaction models communicate with each other using 
dynamic data exchange (DDE). Fig. 3.5 shows a screen shot of the CSTR process model 
implemented using MS Visual C++, the operator model implemented by Visual Prolog and 
the interaction model implemented using the Matlab. A communication link is established in 
a way that the three models can send and receive a command and data from one model to 
another. The DDE is based on the dynamic data exchange management library (DDEML) of 
the MS Windows platform. 
Each model can be a client or server, or both. The clienfs role is to initiate and control 
the communication, while that of the server is to respond to a request from clients by 
obtaining information and then format the information to be usable by the clients. For 
example, the interaction model acting as a client-program requests data and information from 
the server-program (operator and process models) and sends command to server-program to 
be executed. The operator model consists of both the client and server programs because it 
serves the interaction model and is served by the process model. 
All the models shown in Fig. 3.5 are supported by a graphical user interface (GUI), 
which is used to override the process and operator joint simulation system, to stop and carry 
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out from the same point, and to display the behaviour of each model during the operation. 
This gives the process and operator joint simulation system a number of advantages, such as 
monitoring the behaviour of all models, initializing any event during the operation by direct 
access through the GUI, and stopping the simulation at any point to perform a visual 
inspection of a certain process or operator behaviour. 
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Fig. 3.4. Architecture of process-operators joint simulation system. 
The proposed system can contribute in both the retrospective and prospective 
analyses. Prospective such as design decision support system, operator procedures for start 
up and shut down operations, computer interface and safety measure. Retrospective analysis 
is an investigation of past accident and human/process behaviours. The propose system can 
also perform operator and process data classifications during identification of the good and 
the bad operation and operators. For example, the joint system is capable to develop a 
qualitative representation of operator and process operations and classify these operations 
according to the status of the operation region such as abnormal, normal, emergency, good 
operator, bad operator etc. 
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3.5 Summary 
The general framework of the proposed joint process-operator interaction simulation 
system, as shown in Fig. 3.4, is presented. The operator model in the proposed system is 
different from the models developed by other researchers, especially, the two frameworks 
suggested by Cacciabue (1998) and Kazuo et al., (1999). The main drawback of Cacciabue's 
system are: (1) It is applicable for plant behaviour only, (2) It has to be initialised in each 
run, and (3) human action directly carried out by the process model and not though the 
interaction model (human action cannot be perceived by the interaction model). The main 
drawback of Kazuo's system is that it is only applicable for operator's cooperation studies 
and investigation of operator machine interface, which makes it incapable to perform the 
proposed functions and analysis of this research, such as process and operator behaviour 
monitoring and analysis. The main advantages of the proposed joint system are: (1) it has a 
powerful GUI, (2) it can be used for a number of applications and studies, (3) it can perform 
both prospective and retrospective analysis, and (4) it can be used to carry out analysis of 
both dynamic and historical data. 
The advantages of employing the simulation study over the real practice study and the 
type of analysis, simulation and application of joint process-operator simulation system is 
emphasised. In the present development, the proposed framework is shown in Fig. 3.4. The 
interpretation and the planning of the human model is composed of one element, and the 
human stress model is developed using ftizzy logic and is located outside the human model 
and calculated dynamically during the operation. Moreover, the elements and the data 
exchange methods of thejoint process-operator simulation system are detailed. 
The process-operator interaction simulation can have a number of different 
architectures or frameworks depending on the analysis requirement and the type of 
application. In reality, there are no limitations in any of these architectures as long as they 
can perform the required functions. However, with minor and simple modification, the 
human-machine joint operation system can perform other classes of analyses and 
assessments so that it can cover a wide rang of applications. 
so 
Chapter 4 
Operator Behaviour Modelling and Simulation 
This chapter describes the system of operator behaviour modelling and simulation, 
including the functions, elements, models and implementation issues. 
4.1 Introduction 
Mathematical modelling of human behaviour is not a completely new subject. 
Sheridan (1985) described a number of examples of human models going back to the 
1950s, and the field has been growing ever since. It is well worth pointing out, however, 
that the general acceptance of operator modelling was declined in the 1960s and 1970s, 
and the concept of an operator model was very different from the present time. The 
present view of the human model was formed in 1980's with the development of 
cognitive science and artificial intelligent (Al) and of human-computer interactions 
(HCI). The issue of human model in machine control has been dealt with in several books 
by Rasmussen (1986), Hoc et al. (1995) and Cacciabue (1999), and in numerous papers 
and conference proceedings, such as Wan and Young (1996), Johannsen (1997), 
Yoshikawa et al. (1997), Kazuo et al. (1999) and Hirokazu et al. (2000). Improvements in 
human modelling often aim to increase automation, hence change the balance between 
the roles of operators and machines. The research on human modelling has also been 
aimed at improving operational safety although there are still limitations to what can be 
modelled, the success in improving automation and safety cannot be ignored. Chemical 
engineers interest in process safety has focused on the plant and its monitoring and 
control systems, mainly because they regard human behaviour as a management and 
cultural issue. 
This chapter will describe the system developed in this study, which is a 
constituent component of the operator-process interaction system. In the following 
discussion, we will deliberately use the word operator instead of human to refer more 
specifically the personnel, who is directly responsible for monitoring and controlling the 
process. The purpose is not to develop a new theoretical model for operator's behaviour 
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modelling. Instead, it is aimed at developing a system that can be used to carry out the 
studies outlined at the beginning of the thesis. In the next section, theoretical models on 
operator modelling and system architectures, most of them developed in domains other 
than chemical industries will be reviewed, and the method used in this study will be 
described. In section 4.3 the implementation of the model will be discussed. In section 4.4 
simulation runs will be presented to demonstrate the joint operator-process interaction 
system under the proposed operator model and operator's stress models. In section 4.5 an 
industrial case study of operator's performance analysis will be presented and discus. 
Finally a summary of the chapter will be in section 4.6. 
4.2 Theoretical Models on Operator's Behaviour and System 
Architecture 
4. ZI The Human Model of Yoshikawa 
Yoshikawa et al. (1997) developed a human model using Petri-net (Fig. 4.1) to 
analyse and evaluate the effectiveness of man-machine system design through computer 
simulation from various viewpoints of human factors. There are six elements in the 
model, three cognitive fiinctions and three cognitive processes. The first function is 
perception. After getting data from the man-machine interface, the perception function 
interprets and filters the data and then transmits the information to peripheral working 
memory (PWM). The second cognitive function is the focal working memory (FWM). 
This function fetches information from PWM and stores and indexes them in FWM 
conscious world according to their priority, modes and types. The final cognitive function 
is the knowledge base retrieval. It retrieves the information from the KB using keywords 
exactly agree with the higher priority information in the FWM conscious world index. 
The cognitive processes PWM unconscious world and FWM conscious world are simply 
temporary memories and the difference between these two is PWM hold unorganized 
information and FWM hold organized and indexed information. The KB database process 
is a long-term memory, which holds the information, representing the human behaviour 
modelled via Petri-net. However, this system has a number of limitations. The model is 
totally dependent on the KB database represented by Petri-net, which is not sufficient and 
does not describe all the operations because of the limited knowledge of the users and 
operators to enable them to learn or dynamically improve its performances. The model 
also cannot predict new events and does not give clear and detailed description about how 
the results were obtained. 
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4.22 The Human Simulator ofNishitani et al. 
Nishitani et al. (2000) developed a human simulator, (Fig. 4.2) for the design and 
evaluation of the computational models of the human information processing of plant 
operators and psychological approaches to measure the mental state of human operators. 
This operator model composes of three processors and two memories. The perceptual 
processor simulates the operator's awareness of the operational panel information, i. e., 
whether operator notices panel information. The cognitive processor simulates the 
operator's recognition of the current plant state. When the alarm sounds, the cognitive 
processor using the information provided by the knowledge base long-term memory 
would develop an urgent procedure. This procedure will be stored, in 'the short-term 
memory as temporal sequential control program, which can deal with the occurred alarm. 
The motor processor actuates the intended action given by the program created by the 
cognitive processor. The cognitive processor has two modes, a state monitoring mode and 
emergency mode. At monitoring mode, the operator model uses a number of rules stored 
in the knowledge base log-term memory to deal with the normal operation. Once an 
abnormal state is recognised, the cognitive processor switches to the emergency mode 
where an urgent procedure is generated instantaneously. This operator model is much 
better than the previous one because it has the ability to create its own plan from the 
knowledge provided by the long-term memory, while the previous model is not capable 
to do so. However, this model is not capable of updating its own knowledge and 
information dynamically. Therefore, the planning capability depends heavily on the 
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amount and the type of knowledge and information of long-term memory. This limitation 
shows very clearly in Fig. 4.2. The one-way arrow links between long-term memory and 
the cognitive processor, indicating that the data flows only from the long-term memory to 
the cognitive processor. 
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Fig. 4.2. Human model structure in simulation architecture (Nishitani et al., 2000). 
4. Z3 The Model of Cacciabue 
The above work shows that the first activity of human model is perception. 
However, they mainly focused on system implementation, fall short in giving a 
comprehensive and theoretical analysis of operators' activities. The most comprehensive 
theoretical treatment of operator's model was given by Cacciabue (1999) and therefore is 
adapted in this study. Cacciabue (1999) has reviewed various activity models and 
classified operator's cognitive functions into four, i. e., perception, interpretation, planning 
and execution PIPE (Fig. 4.3). Perception implies that some, or all of the information 
produced by the models of the process is actually perceived by the human sensors. The 
second cognitive function of interpretation or recognition is related to the elaboration of 
perceived information, such as identification of cues, pattern recognition, trend analysis, 
and fault detection. Planning implies development of a plan for control or manual action 
carried out as a result of the previous steps of cognitive processes. Finally, the fourth 
54 
cognitive function of execution entails the implementation of the decision, which may 
take the form of manual responses or control actions, but may also be the beginning of a 
new cognitive process. 
The above four activities rely on another two resources, i. e., cognitive process 
memory/knowledge base (KB) and allocation of resources (AoR). The 
memory/knowledge base cognitive process embodies pervious experience, qualitative and 
quantitative knowledge and rules, which support the four cognitive functions. The 
allocation of resources describes how the resources available to the human are distributed 
throughout the model and how they affect the cognitive functions. 
A conceptual framework depicting the relationships is given in Fig. 4.3, the 
connection between the PIPEs shown in Fig. 4.3 represents the human model 
mechanisms, which generates human behaviour such as human actions and procedures. 
These actions and procedures developed by the human model are considered as the 
human model response to a number of events initiated by the interaction model. 
Cognitive functions and processes of the interaction model create these events with the 
knowledge base support. 
The simulation of cognitive functions can be implemented using computational 
means such as fuzzy functions, logic, qualitative rules, and analytical expressions. The 
connection amongst the cognitive functions of perception, interpretation, planning and 
execution is established to maintain the cyclical nature of cognition, by which 
information is perceived from external stimuli, combined with reasoning over past events, 
and with anticipation about planning future response to produce fartfier perception, 
reasoning, and planning. This process is simulated by the repetition of looping the four 
PIPE cognitive functions until the execution of an action is generated. 
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Machine 
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Context 
Stimuli Z - 
- 
Allocation of 
rewures 
Human Model 
Fig. 4.3. Structure of human model (Cacciabue 1999). 
4.3 The Operator's Model Proposed in This Study 
Figure 4.4 shows system's architecture. The system for operator's behaviour is 
developed based on the theoretical framework of operator's activities, i. e., perception, 
interpretation, planning and execution, with the exception that pprception and 
interpretation is implemented in a single module. The core part -of the system is 
implemented as a real-time expert system emulating operator's activities of perception of 
information, interpretation of received signals, planning of activities and their execution. 
The main consideration of using an expert system is that the rules can be easily revised to 
reflect various cognitive scenarios, e. g., operator behaviour. Numerical models are 
integrated into the expert system only when it is necessary, e. g., the stress model of 
operators. 
The rules have been compiled specifically for a case study of a continuous stirred 
tank reactor (CSTR), though some rules apply in principle to any systems, e. g., those 
regarding operation of PID controllers. The system is implemented using visual Prolog, 
which was originally designed to be an artificial intelligent language and is very well 
suited for developing expert systems. Frame and rules, forward and backward chaining, 
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pattern-matching, and constraint-resolution are all natural and elegant expressions of 
Prolog's underlying semantics. Instead of a series of steps specifying how the computer 
must work to solve a problem, a Prolog statement consists of a description of the 
problem. Conceptually, this description is made up of two components. 'Me first 
component is the description of the objects involved in the problem. The second 
component is the facts and rules describing the relations between these objects. The rules 
in Prolog's program specify relations between the given input data and the output, which 
should be generated from the input. 
Fig. 4.4. The proposed human model structure. 
Here are some important considerations in implementing the system: 
(1) The problem boundaries and aim of simulation must be clearly defined. The first 
step is crucial and may be the most important one as it can affect the whole model. 
The main goal or objective of the operator model is to monitor CSTR process 
continuously and to intervene in the process when it is perceived to be necessary. 
The operator model is allowed to change the set point of the controllers (in this case 
the reactant inlet feed flow controller F_in has been chosen). The operator model 
should also keep the product outlet temperature constant during the process 
operation, and has the capability of representing a number of operators during the 
dynamic simulation. Finally, the knowledge of controlling the F_in controller can 
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also be used to control other controllers, such as fresh water inlet feed flow 
controller in auto or manual modes. 
(2) Qualitative technique has been selected for developing the operator model and the 
cognitive tasks are described by a number of facts and rules. Visual Prolog (Version 
5) is used for the implementation, which is Window-based and capable of interacting 
with any other Windows applications dynamically. 
(3) The operator model is represented by a number of facts, rules and the correlation 
between them. Facts, such as the normal state and conditions of the CSTR process, 
in terms of normal temperature, flow and concentration of the product, set points of 
all controllers, and a number of empirically determined coefficients. Rules are 
created from a number of conditions to present the operator mentality process during 
cognition. For example, if the temperature is low but increasing, the operator might 
increase the temperature because it is still low; decrease the temperature because it is 
increasing very fast and the offset from the set point reducing; or not intervene 
because the offset from the set point is very small and it is increasing slowly. 
Therefore, the rules created depend on the value of current temperature differing 
from the set point and the value of the rate of change of temperature. The 
statements, which all rules are based on are, for example, 
Low temperature and increasing. 
Low temperature and decreasing. 
Low temperature and steady. 
High temperature and increasing. 
High temperature and decreasing. 
High temperature and steady. 
Correct temperature and steady. 
Correct temperature and increasing. 
Correct temperature and decreasing. 
For each statement above, the operator model takes only one of the three actions, to 
increase, decrease or not intervene in the reactant inlet flow controller set point. An 
example of the rules in Prolog format is shown in Fig. 4.5. The statement in Fig. 4.5(a) 
means that if the temperature is not very low and increasing slowly, do not intervene in 
the process. 
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check-r8Lf(vl. v2, sy- 
V2>Vl, 
s>vz 
V3-S-V2. 
V3<-I. O. V3>-G. 5, 
V4-V2-Vi. 
V4>-G. O. V4<-0.15. 
assmta(Aat<"steacV'b. I. 
chedc-m(vlyuý- 
V2>Vl, 
S>VZ 
V3-S-VZ 
V3<-I. O, V3>-0.5, 
V4-V2-VI. 
VOG. 15. 
assmta(sWK'deaeaýng)), I. 
(a) 
V2 is the curreit value of the product tenTerature. 
(b) 
VI is the previous value ofthe product temperature 
S is the deired or the Od point value of product tenveratixe. 
Fig. 4.5. Samples of operator model rules in Prolog format. 
The result of the statement is stored in the internal database using Prolog command 
asserta. Obviously the operator model in this case observes the process and decides not 
to take any action, but in Fig. 4.5(b), the operator decides to decrease the temperature 
because the temperature is not very low and increasing rapidly. In this case, the operator 
model must convert its action from qualitative to quantitative values and then transmit the 
value to the process model. This is simply done by the following steps: 
(a) Error (E)= current temperature value (V) - temperature desired value (S). 
(b) Set gain coefficient multiplier (K), based in the error value E. 
(c) Present gain (K2)= gain constant (K I) * K. 
(d) Controller set point-- K2 *E+ previous controller set point (U). 
Note that K and KI are determined empirically and different value of KI can be used 
with the sampling time to represent a number of operators behaviour. 
(4) The initial operator simulator must be tested continuously to tune all the coefficients, 
so that all types of process disturbances can be dealt with and the process operation 
can be brought to steady state condition with minimal time and maximum accuracy. 
The next step is to improve the simulator to fulfill the objective of the fist step. Fig. 
4.6 shows the screen shot of the operator model simulator during the process and 
operator joint interaction simulation. The figure also shows a dialog box for the 
integral gain constant KI and a message box showing the some rules, the decision 
and the final output. 
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4.4 Behaviours of Operators During Joint Process-Operator 
Simulation 
This section presents case studies to demonstrate the use of the system, and to 
study the impact of the operator's behaviour on process performance. The factors 
considered in the case runs include variations in sampling time, ways of operators 
intervention as well as variation of operator's stress. Fuzzy logic (Zadeh 1965) is used to 
-represent the operator stress and sampling time. The ftizzy logic model outputs are 
functions of the absolute product temperature offset from the desired product temperature 
value and the operator intervention measure in the process operation, providing the initial 
conditions are normal at the start of the simulation. There are two fuzzy models 
developed using Matlab Fuzzy Logic Toolbox (1998), to represent the operators A and B. 
Operator B is based on the Mamdani-type of fuzzy and Operator A is based on the 
Sugeno-type fuzzy inference. The main difference between the two types is that the 
output membership functions of the Sugeno-type inference are only linear or constant. 
Since Matlab Fuzzy Logic Toolbox is used to implement both human behaviour models, 
only the Operator B model will be described momentarily in this section. However there 
are two operator models which have different behaviour in term of stress, intervene, 
sampling time and integral gain. The fuzzy model of Operator B has two inputs and two 
outputs. Each input and output is represented by three membership functions. Trapezium 
membership function is used for the input, triangle membership function for the output 
and centroid for defuzzification (the centre of area under the curve). The rules, which 
represent the Operator B are: 
if (active is normal) and (offset is ok) then (stress is relax)(time is slow) 
If (active is normal) and (offset is critical) then (stress is ok)(time is medium) 
if (active is normal) and (offset is danger) then (stress is worry)(time is fast) 
if (active is busy) and (offset is danger) then (stress is worry)(time is fast) 
if (active is busy) and (offset is critical) then (stress is worry)(time is fast) 
If (active is busy) and (offset is ok) then (stress is worry)(time is fast) 
If (active is cautious) and (offset is ok) then (stress is relax)(time is slow) 
if (active is cautious) and (offset is ok) then (stress is ok)(time is medium) 
If (active is cautious) and (offset is danger) then (stress is worry)(time is fast) 
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The first input of If statement (active) is represented by cautious, busy and normal 
membership function. The input parameter is a measure of the operator intervention in the 
process operation. Initially this measure is set to zero and every time the operator 
intervenes in the process operation, the measurement will be increased by one. If the 
operator does not intervene in the process operation but only observes, intervene 
measurement will be decreased by one. The maximum measurement of the operator 
intervene is 10 and the minimum is -10. A value of 10 means that the operator is very 
active due to abnormal process operation and the value -10 means that the operator does 
not intervene in the process operation for a long period of time. If statement second input 
(offset) is represented by ok, critical or dangerous membership function. The input 
parameter is the absolute value of the difference between the desired and the actual value 
of the product output temperature. The fiazy model outputs are the stress and the 
sampling time of the operator. Stress is represented by relaxes, ok or worry membership 
functions and timing is represented by slow, medium or fast membership function. The 
Maximum and the minimum value of stress is 0.1 and -0.1. A value of 0.1 means the 
operator under considerable load and a value of -0.1 means the operator is relaxed. The 
operator sampling time varies from 2 to 7 seconds. Operator observes the process 
operation or intervenes in the process operation more frequently during abnormal process 
operation. Therefore his/her sampling time must be shorter, down to 2 or 3 seconds. 
As soon as the interaction model detects the operator's low stress measurement, it 
will initiate disturbance and start monitoring and recording the operator's activities. 
When the process starts to recover from the disturbance's influence after operator's 
intervention, the operator will start to relax and whose stress measurement starts to 
decrease and eventually becomes very low. The interaction model will detect the low 
stress measure and initiates a new disturbance to monitor and record the subsequent 
operator activities and behaviour. New knowledge, rules and information will be 
extracted from these records and used to identify the operators' features for future 
operations and design. 
4.4.1 Behaviour of Operator B 
Figure 4.7 shows the projection of the CSTR operation in the reduced low 
dimensional space (the low dimensional I' PC and 2nd PC space is obtained using 
principal component analysis). The red, blue and green colours represent three 
operational zones. The black asterisk point shows the trajectory of the operational point 
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when the process is under the influence of disturbances. In this case, three disturbances 
are the reactant feed temperature, the reactant concentration and the cooling water feed 
temperature. Fig. 4.7 shows 250 samples of the operational path of Operator B during an 
abnormal operation caused by three disturbance events. Fig. 4.8 is the decomposed 
operational path of Fig. 4.7, showing the starting and the ending position of the 
operational path for the first disturbance event in 4.8a, the second disturbance event in 
4.8b, and the final disturbance event in 4.8c. Both figures indicate that Operator B is able 
to maintain the operation within the normal operation and avoid other operational zones. 
Referring to Figures 4.9 to 4.11, the behaviour of Operator B to each disturbance can be 
summarised in the following three steps: 
(1) The absolute offset of the reactor temperature from the set point (Fig. 4.9b) is 
suddenly increased by 2*K due to an external disturbance event at the sample point 
9. Operator B detects the change and develops a sudden stress measure, (Fig. 4.1 Oa) 
of 0.1 (maximum stress). Operator B then decides to intervene (Fig. 4.9a) in the 
process operation every 3 seconds, (Fig. 4.10b) at sampling point 13 and stops 
intervention at the sample point 57, while his/her stress is still at a high level. When 
the temperature offset drops dramatically, the operator stress decreases and his/her 
intervention time becomes 4 seconds instead of 3. This occurs only once at sampling 
point 31. After sample point 57, the operator's stress starts to decrease and the 
intervention in the process stops completely. The operator at this point considers that 
the process is recovering and is under his/her control, so it needs only to observe the 
process every 7 seconds without any intervention in the process operation. Figs. 
4.11 a&4.11 b show the reactor temperature shoots up to 390K while the operator 
decreases the reactant feed flow set point to bring the product temperature back to 
380K. The operator starts to increase the reactant feed flow set point at the sample 
point 31 before the product temperature reaches 380K because he/she realises that 
the temperature decreases so fast and it will drop below the set point value. 
(2) At the sample point 85, the temperature offset suddenly jumps up by 3.6*K, (Fig. 
4.9b), and the operator stress instantly reaches to maximum, (Fig. 4.1 Oa) from a low 
stress state indicating that the operator is at a state of great stress. And at once, the 
operator starts to intervene in the process operation every 3 seconds. The operator 
stops to intervene in the process at the sample point 106 and starts again after 7 
seconds, then stops completely at the sample point 116, where the offset temperature 
becomes very low. The operator continues to observe the process at every 6 seconds 
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with no more intervention in the process operation until the sample point 189. From 
sample point 83 to 163 (Figs. 4.11 a and 4.11 b), show how the operator manages to 
control the product temperature without any overshoot, just by reducing the set point 
at an earlier time than the first process operation recovery. 
(3) At the sample point 164, the temperature offset increases only by 0.6 "K (Fig. 4.9b). 
The operator detects the temperature changes after 2 sample points and does not 
react instantly as in the previous event. This is due to the long duration of the 
operator relaxation time, which is indicated by the duration of the negative stress 
measure before the sample point 166 (Fig. 4.1 Oa). The operator starts to intervene in 
the process at that point with a sampling time of 6 seconds and then gradually 
reduces his/her intervention time to 3 seconds. At the sampling point 178 the 
operator stress drops to -0.05, which makes the operator to change his/her attitude 
from intervention to observation every 6 seconds. 
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Fig. 4.8. Operation path decAmposition of Operator B, showing threc-captured 
activities of the operator during disturbed Operation. 
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Fig. 4.9. (a) Operator B intervene measure. (b) The absolute product temperature offset 
from the desired temperature value. The values of (a) and (b) are used as the Fuzzy logic 
model input for prediction the human operator stress and sampling time. 
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Fig. 4.10. (a) Operator B stress measure. (b) Operator B sampling time during the 
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4.4.2 Behaviour of Operator A 
Fig. 4.12 shows Operator A's operation path during the abnormal operation 
caused by the same three disturbances applied to Operator B. Fig. 4.13 is the decomposed 
operational path of Fig. 4.12, showing the start and end positions of the operational path 
for the first disturbance event in Fig. 4.13a, the second disturbance event in Fig. 4.13b, 
and the third disturbance event in Fig. 4.13c. All figures indicate that Operator A operates 
the process not within a single operational region. The operator in the first event moved 
the process outside the normal operational region. In the second event, the operator 
moved the operation back to the original location of normal operation region. in the final 
event, the operator moved the operation outside of the normal operational region and then 
returned it back to the edge of the normal operation zone. Referring to Figs. 4.14 to 4.16, 
the behaviour of Operator A toward each disturbance event can be summarised in the 
following three steps: 
(1) Operator A observed a change in the product temperature output earlier than the 
Operator B by a sample (Operator A observed the change at sample point 8, while 
Operator B observed the change at sample point 9). This is because the Operator A 
was observing the process operation every 5 seconds, while Operator B was 
observing the process operation every 6 seconds. Early observation of product 
temperature offset of IK (Fig. 4.14b) caused less stress on Operator A at the starting 
of the simulation a value of 0.03 of stress was recorded for Operator A while a value 
of 0.1 recorded for Operator B at the start of the simulation. Initially, the Operator A 
intended to intervene every 5 seconds, but did not do so and waited for a few more 
seconds. The operator started to intervene in the process every 3 seconds at the 
sample point 13, (Fig. 4.15b), and continuously intervened in the process operation 
at different timing depending on the temperature offset, (Fig. 4.14a). It was noticed 
that if the temperature offset is more than I*K, the operator intervenes in the process 
operation every 3 seconds but if the temperature offset is less than I*K, the operator 
intervenes every 4 seconds. From the sample points 0 to 80 (Fig. 4.16 a and b), the 
operator continuously changed the set point of the reactant feed flow, which caused 
the product temperature to oscillate at first disturbance event. 
(2) At the sample point 84, a new disturbance event was initiated and the operator stress 
increased. Operator A did not change his/her intervene time (sampling time), which 
is every 4 seconds (Fig. 4.15b). This causes the product temperature offset to 
increase dramatically at the sample point 86. At this instant, the operator panicked 
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and reduced the intervening time to 3 seconds and then to 2 seconds, which caused 
the temperature offset to decrease. The operator returned his/her intervention time to 
3 seconds until the temperature offset becomes less than VK at the sample point 108. 
From sample point 80 to 160 (Fig. 4.16a and b), the operator at this event managed 
to keep the product temperature closer to the desired value with slight oscillations. 
(3) At the sample point 163, the temperature offset increased and the operator stress 
started to rise (Figs. 4.14b and. 4.15a). Obviously, the operator reduced his/her 
intervening time to 3 seconds and started to be more active to avoid a surge of 
temperature offset. During this event the operator thought that he/she was in control. 
At the sample point 172, the operator increased his/her intervening time to 4 
seconds, which caused the temperature offset to increase. In turn, this caused the 
operator stress to rise. This situation repeated at the sample point 86, which made the 
temperature offset to rise and cause the operator to reduce his/her intervening time to 
3 seconds. The operator finally stopped to intervene in the process operation at the 
sample point 230, where the stress dropped to less than 0.4. Samples point from 160 
to the final sample (Fig. 4.16) shows that the operator managed to control the 
product temperature eventually after a few oscillations. 
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Fig. 4.13. Operation path decomposition of Operator A, showing three-captured 
activity of the operator during disturbed process operation condition. 
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Fig. 4.14. (a) Operator A intervene measure. (b) The absolute product temperature offset 
from the desired temperature value. The values of (a) and (b) are used as the Fuzzy logic 
model input. 
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4.5 An Industrial Case Study of Analysing Operator's 
Performance 
This section describes an industrial case study that further demonstrates the 
analysis of the operator's performance using the process operational data. 
4.5.1 The Case Study 
The case study is concerned with a refinery fluid catalytic cracking process (FCC) 
as shown in Fig. 4.17. One of the products of the process is light diesel whose quality is 
typically characterised by the temperature of condensation. Chen and Wang (1998) 
designed a software sensor using feed forward neural networks (FFNN) for predicting the 
condensation point using fourteen easy-to-measure process variables of Table 4.1. The 
process is required to produce three product grades according to seasons and market 
demand, namely -10#, 0# and 5# defined by the ranges of condensation temperature. PCA 
and fuzzy c-means were applied to the data of the size 303xl4 (number of data 
patternsxnumber of process variables), and the PCI and PC2 two-dimensional plot is 
shown in Fig. 4.18, which shows that the data patterns are grouped into four clusters 
(Sebzalli and Wang 2000 and 2001). 
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Table 4.1. Fourteen Process Variables. 
TI-I I -T on tray 22 where the light diesel is withdrawn 
TI-12 -T on tray 20 where the light diesel is withdrawn 
TI-33 -T on tray 19 
TI-42 -T on tray 16, i. e., the initialTof the pumparound 
TI-20 -the return T of the pumparound 
F215 -the flowrate of the pumparound 
TI-09 -column top T 
TI-00 -reaction T 
F205 -fresh feed flowrate to the reactor 
F204 -flowrate of the recycle oil 
FlOl -steam flowrate 
FR- I -steam flowrate 
FIQ22 -flowrate of over-heated steam 
F207 -flowrate of rich-absorbent oil 
4.5.2 FurtherAnalysis 
In this study, we have tested two, four and seven PCs to cluster the data into three, 
four and five clusters. For each cluster, the probability distribution according to the 
product condensation temperature was plotted. It was found that all clusters follow 
normal distribution. It was also found that it is more appropriate to cluster the data into 
four clusters, because in the case of five clusters, two clusters give normal distributions 
around the same value of condensation temperature. While in the case of three clusters, 
one has a very poor distribution, which is evidenced by a large standard deviation. 
Examination of the results also revealed that four and seven PCs though give similar 
clustering results and the differences is mainly in the assignments of a few data cases, 
seven PCs are slightly better because they gives smaller standard de viations. Fig. 4.18 
shows the distributions according to condensation temperatures of products when four 
and seven PCs were used. Therefore in the following discussion we will only consider 
four clusters. 
Interestingly, it was found that three clusters correspond to three products -10#, 5# 
and 0# and the cluster at the bottom-right corner was found to be a cluster that though is 
close to 0# but has very poor distribution and is an area which has a high probability of 
product off-specification. 
Therefore the strategy for operation should be operating the process in the region 
of the bottom-left if the desired product is -10#; in the region at the top if the desired 
product is 5#; in the region at the middle if the desired product is 0#, and try to avoid the 
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region at the bottom-right comer. Another point is that in order to move fi-om producing - 
10# to 0#, adjusting PCI is more important than changing PC2. While to switch fi-om 
producing 0# to 5#, PC2 is more important than PC I. Both PC I and PC2 are important in 
avoiding die region at the bottorn-right comer, which produces off-specification product. 
It is important to notice that the region at the bottom right comer, which should be 
avoided in operation was not anticipated before the analysis. 
Close examination gives a more interesting discovery regarding the region at the 
bottom-right comer of Fig. 4.17. It is very likely caused by operators during product 
changeover. For example, 117-124 at the bottom-right comer were due to transition from 
region of -10# (1-116) to the region of product 0# (125-191). Other data cases in the 
bottom-right comer can also be explained similarly. Data patterns 211 and 212 were due 
to transition from the 5# region (192-210) to the -10# region (213-242); 243-244, due to 
transition from -10# region (213-242) to 0# region (245-271); 278-288 due to transition 
from 5# (272-277) to 0# (289-303). It shows that some transition took longer time. If the 
knowledge discovered had been known, the transition tune could have been reduced. 
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Fig. 4.18. The PC I -PC2 plot. 
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4.5.3 Discovery of Operational Strategies 
Because PCI and PC2 are latent variables, it is necessary to link PCI and PC2 to 
the original variables in order to provide guidance to operators for monitoring and 
adjustment during product changeover. To this purpose, variable contribution plots were 
used. 
The contribution plot for PCI is the plot of PCI against the coefficients for the 14 
original variables and is shown in Fig. 4.19 (a), from which it is found that the most 
important variables are TI-12 (the temperature on tray 20 where the product is 
withdrawn) and TI-42 (the temperature on tray 16 close to the flashing zone). This result 
is consistent with the analysis based on principles that the temperature on the tray where 
the product is withdrawn and the temperature at the flashing zone have most important 
impact on the sidedraw product. Some other variables are found not important such as 
FR-1. The above discovery is confirmed by looking at the change of TI-12 over the 303 
data patterns (Fig. 4.19 (b)). It clearly shows that from the value of TI-12, it is able to 
distinguish product -10# from 0# and 5#, but not between 0# and 5#. When the 
temperature TI-12 is below 2300C, the product is -10#. When TI-12 is between 2300C 
and 2500C, the product is either 0# or 5#. If the temperature is above 2SOOC, it is very 
likely to produce off-specification products. 
Figure 4.19 (a) also indicates that some other variables are much less important to 
PCI, which implies that they are not influential in moving the operation from producing 
product -10# to 0#. The steain flowrate to the riser tube reactor (FR-1) is an example. 
From its changing profile (Fig. 4.19 (d)), it can be seen that FR-I does not reflect the 
different conditions leading to products -10# and 0#. 
The contribution plot of PC2 is shown in Fig. 4.19 (c), which indicates that FR- I is 
the most influential variable. The FR-I profile is given in Fig. 4.19 (d) clearly shows that 
FR-1 can distinguish product 5# from 0# and -10#, but not between 0# and . 10#. When 
the value of FR-1 is above 8.5, the product is S#. When FR-l is between 5 and 8.5, the 
product is either 0# or -10#. Though not very clear, it can still see that when FR-1 is 
below 6.5, the operation goes into the region producing off-specification product. 
The discovery that FR-1 is the most important variable to PC2 and so in 
distinguishing product 0# from 5# and -10# was not anticipated. In fact, because of the 
multivariate and non-linear nature of the problem, some variables, which are important to 
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product quality in one operational region, may become less important in a different 
region. 
The above analysis on the contributions of individual variables to PCI and PC2, 
and so to the operational states is also consistent with the observation on Fig. 4.17 that 
both PCI and PC2 are influential to the zone at the bottom-right comer. From Fig. 4.19 
(a, b, c &d) we can see that TI-12 and FR-I all can have significant influence on this 
zone. Therefore to change the operation from producing -10# to P, we should first 
increase TI-12 and TR-42 and then increase FR-1. In order to avoid off-spccification 
product from being produced we should carefully monitor TI-12, TR-42 and FR-I to 
avoid the region at the bottom-right comer. Of course it is important to be aware that fine- 
tuning of all the variables is necessary but the guidance can help operators to move the 
process from producing one product quicker to another. 
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4.6 Summary 
The structure and finictions of the proposed operator module are described. The 
operator is considered as the most difficult element to model in a joint process-operator 
interaction system TIiis is due to the complexity of the human brain and the difference of 
human mentality measurement, which is influenced by external and internal factors. The 
major elements of the developed human model are discussed. Although the system is still 
not very sophisticated, it is sufficient for carrying out the proposed studies in this work. A 
practical example has be given in a scenarios to show, a confidant Operator B and a 
nervous Operator A- Fuzzy membership functions were used to represent the degree of 
nervousness models of both A and B operators (refer to section 4.4 for a fiill description). 
Operator B has low average number of intervention and stress, and higher average 
intervention time (sampling time). Mile Operator A has higher average of stress and 
number of intervention, and lower average of intervention time. Operator B manages to 
be in control during the process operation while Operator A has some difficulties. 
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Fig. 4.20. (a) contributing plot of PCI, (b) changing profile of TI-12 (c) 
contribution plot of PC2 and (d) changing profile of FR-I. 
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This is clearly shown from the paths of the operation and the results of the 
graphical analysis. Finally, the results and data can be used to extract the behaviour 
features of each operator, for example each operator should have different averages, 
distributions, variances and standard deviations of stress, number of intervention and 
intervention times. These behaviour features combined with other operator features, such 
as the operational path, can be used to identify the effectiveness of an operator during the 
dynamic operation or historical data analysis. 
An industrial case study was also presented which further proved that the operator 
behaviour can be assessed through analysing historical operational data. 
Dynamically monitoring the paths or trajectories of operation in the low 
dimensional operational spaces also presents a useful way for capturing operators near- 
miss or near-hit. Pervious industrial practices rely on operators to report near-miss 
situations. However some times operators may not be aware of such situations. 
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Chapter 5 
The Process-Operator Interaction Module 
This chapter describes the role and the implementation issues of the process- operator 
interaction module. 
5.1 Introduction 
The simplest way of interaction between machine and operator modules in a joint 
process-operator simulation system is clearly through direct connection, as depicted in Fig. 
5.1a. In practice, such a simple and straightforward connection is far from sufficient. There 
are a number of factors that complicate the interactions. Both the operator and process 
models generate a variety of complex and highly correlated outputs, which need to be 
filtered, transformed and sometimes interpreted before being fed to another model. The 
dynamic behaviour and time dependent feature of interaction also represents an element of 
complexity, because the effects of the process response and operator's action may not occur 
in sequence and usually evolve in parallel with different time constants. Thus it requires time 
management to be embedded in the interaction module. As a result, it is necessary to have an 
interaction module to manage and control the communication between the process and 
operator models (Fig. 5.1 b). In this study, the interaction module is also wed as an interface 
to monitor the performance of the operator, the process and the joint system. Faults and 
disturbances are also initiated and data recording managed through the interface of 
interaction module. 
This chapter is organised as follows. In Section 5.2, previous studies on interaction 
models in man-machine simulation systems will be bricfly reviewed. Though none of the 
models was proposed for process industries, they have inspired the development of our 
process-operator interaction module. The proposed interaction module and its 
implementation will be described in Section 5.3. Section 5.4 describes the graphical user 
interface and the implementation of a proposed fuzzy qualitative methodology for modelling 
the temporal behaviour of the process-operator joint system. Final remarks will be made in 
Section 5.5. 
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Fig. 5.1. The process-operator interaction module architecture. 
5.2 Published Models on Man-Machine Interactions 
5.21 Reviews ofPublishedModels 
Cacciabue (1999) conducted a comprehensive literature review of the man-machine 
interaction models and identified three major elements in a man-machine interaction system, 
i. e., time management, logical man-machine interactions and dynamic reliability. Time 
management deals with the independent time steps for process and operator simulations and 
the exchange of data to achieve synchronisation between the operator and process 
simulation. The logical man-machine interaction filters all information that is produced by 
the process and operator models, using special algorithms, which consider the logical 
connection that exist between interconnected events. Dynamic reliability handles false and 
incomplete information or process failures and operator effors, which will provide 
experiences in the man-machine simulation studies. Fig. 5.2 shows the theories and their 
computational means employed by the interaction model of Cacciabue (1999). The time 
management element in the interaction module employs logic models and time management. 
The logical man-machine interaction element employs first or higher order logic 
(Dubois and Prade 1980; Van Orman Quine 1959), which is particular suitable for the 
representation of qualitative and "quasi-numerical" thinking. Dynamic reliability uses 
statistical theory such as Markov chains (Bharucha-Reid, 1960), and state transition 
diagrams such as Petri Nets (Peterson, 1981), which can describe the time dependencies and 
multiple correlations between the elements of the man-machine system. 
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Fig 5.2. Elements of the interaction model and computational means (Cacciabue, 1999). 
A major role of the interaction model is to manage the flow of the information and the 
data in the human-machine interaction system. Therefore, Cacciabue (1999) classified the 
information and the data into two types. The first type is the dynamic data, which consists 
of the variables that are dynamically calculated by the human and the machine models and 
then dynamically changed, such as the set point and auto/manual modes, as well as the 
various failure and error modes. The second type is static data, which includes the 
parameters related to the human and the machine models, such as'what are normal and 
abnormal behayiours, and the casual relationships about failures and errors. Static data 
related to the operator model also includes event sequences, which cause the operator 
model to perform certain behaviour. 
Dynamic data is dynamically generated and exchanged by the human and machine 
systems, while static data is defined in the design stage and stored in the data or knowledge 
base. The interaction module manages the specific information to be transferred from one 
mo del to another. This needs to be performed continuously during the time step of dynamic 
evolvement. For example, during the fault diagnosis, the interaction module combines the 
dynamic data, such as physical quantities and indicator values calculated by the machine 
model, with static data, such as failure casual relationships defined at the beginning of the 
analysis, to find the location and the mode of failure. 
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In order to manage the data exchange between the human and the machine models, 
the interaction module requires a large amount of input data and information. These large 
input quantities are classified according to the types, modes and probabilities of operator 
error and component failures, which are related to process disturbances, and operator actions 
and decisions. Therefore, all data, information and knowledge have to be organised in data 
architecture in order to support the operator-process interaction system. 
The interaction module can retrieve data from the global database or from its own 
database, depending on the architecture of the overall process-operator interaction system. 
Data retrieved from the database by the interaction module mainly concerns the reliability 
and logical behaviour of process, and operator constituents, which are usually in the form of 
failure modes, error modes, failure rates, or failure types. The data and information are 
necessary to predict the temporal operational state. The time management element of the 
interaction module manages the data flow from the database to the dynamic memory of the 
interaction module, and vice versa. The data holds the logical behaviour of process and 
operator constituents, which are usually in the form of failure modes, error modes and failure 
rate, and are used to determine the present dynamic state of the process and operator 
behaviours. 
The dynamic reliability element of the interaction module is complex. The typical 
problem of the reliability analysis goes beyond the classical approaches, such as fault trees 
and event tree methods (Feller, 1968; Hoyland and Rausand, 1994). A number of approaches 
have been developed to permit the evolution of the probabilistic behaviour of system 
unavailability versus time and dynamic reliability, when the process is decomposed into a 
reasonable number of super-components. These dynamic approaches are based on the state 
transition diagrams theory (e. g. Petri Nets) and Markov chains (Vesely and Goldberg, 1977; 
Jeong et al. 1987; Aldemir et al. 1994). Although these methods can handle the stochastic 
behaviour of components very well, they are limited in dealing with the actual interaction 
between the process of the dynamic behaviour of physical variables and dynamic change of 
components operating state (Siu, 1994). Hassan and Aldemir (1990) tried to solve 
logical/reliability problem by developing a methodology that separates the physical and 
probabilistic analysis, and assesses event sensitivity due to the uncertainty on the component 
failure data. Another approach by Aldemir (1987) is based on the continuous event tree 
method, which links the system module to probabilistic treatment using Markovian or semi- 
Markovian chains in a complete theoretical analysis. Both the dynamic event tree method 
(Siu. and Acosta, 1991) and the dynamic logical analysis methodology (Cojazzi and 
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Cacciabue, 1994) combine a quantitative dynamic process model and probabilistic analysis 
in dynamic conditions to evaluate both reliability and physical behaviour in an integrated 
architecture. The objective of the above methods is to combine the physical simulation and 
probabilistic evaluation in manageable computer architecture, without requiring too complex 
analysis. These methodologies generate sequences showing how faults occur (systematic 
analysis), assign an initial configuration to the process, and study a limited number of critical 
process conditions. 
5.22 Observations 
One of the problems associated with the above reviewed models is that all possible 
states of a component need to be pre-defined and stored in the knowledge base before any 
simulation or analysis of a process-operator interaction. This is not always possible since 
some states might have never been experienced in practice. Therefore, if a new state of a 
component occurs, the interaction module will generate incorrect sequence and initiate 
wrong configuration. This is the nature of the knowledge base, since the knowledge is 
dependent on past experience of the developed knowledge. The inability of learning or 
dynamically improve in performance is also a factor. Ideally, the interaction module should 
be able to learn to create its own knowledge and rules, and to improve its performance 
continuously during dynamic operation. In addition, the interaction system should be able to 
deal with both quantitative and qualitative data, and the causal relationships of variables as 
well as causal relationships of the whole process. The reviewed systems do not have modules 
that can handle dynamic causal relationships among process variables, operator actions and 
fault modes. Furthermore, the reviewed human-machine interaction systems focus on 
studying of the dynamic behaviour of the joint simulation system. One of the fundamental 
differences of the current effort from the previous work is that we intend to develop a system 
that can automatically characterise and assess the skills and behaviour of operational 
personnel. This function has never been considered in the review studies. 
5.3 Architecture and Functions of the Proposed Interaction Module 
Fig. 5.3 depicts the conceptual architecture of the process-operator interaction module, 
the constituent elements, data flows, and the control links. The characteristics and the 
functions of each element will be described below. 
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The first two elements of the interaction module are the input/output blocks. All data 
and information from the process and operator simulation, including operator's actions and 
instant values of process variables are acknowledged of their existence in the input buffer 
and ready to be processed by other elements of the interaction module. The output buffer 
contains all the data and information to be transferred to the process or operator modules, 
such as set points of controllers and manual/auto modes, new and updated knowledge and 
rule base for the operator model and start-up/shutdown procedures of the process. 
Disturbance creator is designed to generate various disturbances in the joint system, 
representing operator errors and external disturbances influencing the process and operator 
behaviour. This element contains statistical methods, such as normal distributions, which 
generates disturbances systematically. 
The data structure element is responsible for transforming and representing the data 
and information in the appropriate formats and structures, to allow easy data access and to be 
processed by all elements within the module. For example, the rules can be represented, 
stored and processed in three different formats, such as verbose (words), symbolic and 
indexed (or references). This element is also responsible for adding noise to data and 
calculating a number of data properties, such as the mean and standard deviation. 
The validation and evaluation element is responsible for testing the graphical 
qualitative model for simulating the temporal behaviour of the joint operator-process 
system, which will be detailed in Chapters 6 and 7. The mathematical methods used in this 
element are based on statistical techniques, such as analysis of variance and standard 
deviation. 
The interaction model elements controller of the interaction module (Fig. 5.3) control 
all data flow between the elements within the interaction module as well as the data flow 
between the process and operator modules. The element employs both combinational and 
sequential logic methods to carry out a number of different tasks. The bi-directional links 
between the interaction module elements, such as the controller and other elements of the 
interaction module (Fig. 5.3) make it possible to transfer codes and signals all around the 
joint process-operator interaction system dynamically. Codes representing information about 
the location of the elements are defined for the data exchange between the system elements, 
data types and formats identification, and function types to be carried out by each element. 
This element employs a signal-addressing system to address all elements of the joint process- 
operator interaction system and to enable/disable each element during any operation. 
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5.4 The Theory and Principle Element 
The theory and principle element is depicted in Fig. 5.4. It includes various 
mathematical techniques required to carry out the tasks of the interaction. The mathematical 
techniques are used to represent the behaviour of the operational personnel and cluster 
process operational data, and identify the number of regions of operation. The mathematical 
techniques are organised as a number of computational function blocks, which are 
dynamically linked according to the tasks that have to be executed. For example, if data has 
to be classified into regions, a PCA model will be first used and then the PCA result is 
passed to the fuzzy c-means clustering block to classify the operational regions. During this 
process the dynamic link is established between the dynamic memory, PCA and fuzzy c. 
means clustering blocks. Similarly, if a graphical data representation is required, the dynamic 
link will be established between the associated including PCA, fuzzy c-means and fuzzy 
digraphs. 
The element of the rule and knowledge bases also contains rules for carrying out the 
task of time management and dynamic reliability analysis. The rules represent a repository of 
structured expertise gained during continuous simulation of the joint process-operator 
interaction system. The disturbance creator element dynamically produces disturbances 
representing operator errors and external disturbances influencing the process and operator's 
behaviour. The element contains statistical methods such as normal distributions, which can 
be used to systematically generate disturbances. 
A very important part of the theory and principle element is a fuzzy causal network 
system, which is developed for combined qualitative/quantitative simulation of the temporal 
behaviour of the joint process-operator interaction system. Chapters 6 and 7 will summarises 
the procedure of applying the fuzzy causal network as well as the mathematical methods 
using the directed blocks. The procedure involves processing dynamic trend signals using 
principal component analysis and fuzzy c-means clustering for the purpose of qualitative 
interpretation of dynamic trend signals, and sectioning the clusters for more accurate 
interpretation, and generation of rules for qualitative reasoning. 
5.5 The Graphical User Interface (GUI) of the Interaction Module 
The GUI represents a very important part of the interaction module because it is a 
monitoring and displaying system for all operations on the joint operator-process interaction 
system. Fig. 5.5 shows a screenshot of the GUL The qualitative values of process variables 
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and the set points of controllers are shown at the top-left comer of the window. Below the set 
points are data on sampling periods in seconds, sampling counter, the number of samples in 
each file saved, and the number of clusters. The start and stop buttons of the simulation are at 
the bottom of the window. On the right hand side of the window, there are three display 
boxes. The top one shows the operational state spaces of the process, which are represented 
by the zones covered with small circles of different colours. A dark asterisk indicates the 
present operational location. The two smaller display boxes underneath show the variability 
of the variables responsible for the location of the present operation, i. e., T_out and CA_ouý 
respectively. 
Fig. 5.6 shows the operational procedure of the joint operator-process interaction 
simulation system and data generation. The steps can be summarised as follows: 
(1) Load the PCA module and relevant data such as mean, standard deviation and loading 
matrix. The PCA model is developed previously from historical data. 
(2) Initialise all parameters, variables and graphics object handlers with values at normal 
steady state operation. If the process is initially not at normal steady state operation, the 
system can be directed to return to normal operation. 
(3) Acquire all data from the process simulator and convert them to the format required for 
the GUI display. The data structure is also changed so that it can be easily accessed by 
other elements in the integrated system. 
(4) Check if new disturbances are initiated. If true, the new disturbances will be imposed 
onto the process system. At the same time, the counter is set to one and data recording 
starts. If false, the system proceeds to the next step. 
(5) Predict and display the current operational location in the PC I and PC2 state space 
plane. 
(6) Determine the variables accountable for the current location of the operational region 
and then plot them in the appropriate boxes. 
(7) If the counter number reaches a predefined number, say ninety, the data is saved. A new 
disturbance can be initiated and a new cycle begins. This process can be terminated at 
any time by executing the stop command. 
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Figs. 5.7 to 5.9 show three operational scenarios of the process subjected to 
disturbance in cooling water inlet temperature (Twin), and the corresponding responses due 
to no operator intervention (Fig. 5.7), intervention by an inexperienced Operator A (Fig. 5.8), 
and intervention by an experienced Operator B (Fig. 5.9), respectively. The directed digraphs 
show the disturbances represented by red circles, the controlled variables represented by the 
green circles, and the other variables represented by dark circles. The dark arrows represent 
the present operational status and the relationships between variables. 
In Fig. 5.7 the initial and final locations of the operational point are clearly marked. A 
series of dark asterisk indicate the trajectory of the process evolvement when Twin changes 
and there is no intervention from operators. This casual digraph reveals that the disturbance 
Twin influences T_out, and T_out influences C_out, while T_out and Fwin influence each 
other until the process reaches a new steady state after fifty-nine samples. 
Fig. 5.8 shows a different path of evolvement under the influence of the same Twin 
disturbance, but with the intervention of the inexperienced Operator A, who changed the set 
point of the feed flow (Fjn). The operator brought the process to a steady state after fifty-six 
samples. The figure also shows that at some instants, Operator A was confused and uncertain 
about the overall conditions of the process operation. However, Operator A realised that the 
process had to stop at one point because it might become uncontrollable. This is indicated by 
the final position of the dark asterisk, which shows that if the operator had continued to 
intervene in the process operation, it would go beyond the normal operational region. 
Figure 5.9 shows the path of the evolvement under the influence of the same Twin 
disturbance, but with the intervention of the confident Operator B in the F in set point. This 
operation reveals that the operator let the process to take control first and then intervened. 
This is indicated by the direction of the first two samples in the digraph. However, the above 
behaviour can be interpreted in different ways. Operator B might not acknowledge the 
change in the process operation, might be slowly to response initially, or might be 
intentionally not to intervene at the initial stage because of confidence and skill. The most 
likely answer is that the Operator B was confident because the process became steady after 
thirty-three samples. 
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These examples show the amount of information that can be extracted from the GUI 
instantly under system-monitoring mode. Other information, such as the process operation 
path, time to reach steady state conditions, variables variance, variables evolving trajectories 
during operation, and variables trends will be used in extracting rules and knowledge, as well 
as in the operators performance analysis. 
5.6 Summary 
To develop an effective joint process-operator interaction simulation system, it is not 
sufficient to rely on direct exchange of data, and it is necessary to have an interaction 
module. In this chapter, the basic functions and implementation issues of the proposed 
interaction module are described. The main functions of the module are, (1) managing the 
time steps of the joint process-operator simulation system, (2) handling the exchange of data 
between the process and operator simulation modules, (3) monitoring the performance of the 
process and operator simulation as well as of the joint system, and (4) initiating disturbances 
and managing data recording. The implementation issues of the interaction module can be 
resolved by using a qualitative fizzy digraph method for temporal modelling, and 
continuously monitoring the temporal behaviours of the joint process-operator interaction 
system. 
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Chapter 6 
A Digraph Method for Qualitative/ Quantitative Modelling 
of the Dynamics of Combined Operator-Process Systems 
6.1 Introduction 
Qualitative models have in recent Years attracted much attention in process fault 
diagnosis and behaviour description. This is because qualitative models can handle 
incomplete information, function with incomplete data, and most importantly, provide 
transparent and causal explanations of systems behaviour. 
In this chapter, pervious work on qualitative process modelling is reviewed and a 
new digraph method is developed for quantitative/qualitative modelling of the temporal 
behaviour ofjoint operator-process systems. Section 6.2 provides a state-of-the-art review of 
qualitative reasoning for fault diagnosis using signed digraphs (SDO), and the progress on 
applying digraphs to model the temporal behaviour of processes. Some observations are 
made in Section 6.3. The proposed method is presented in Sections 6.4 and 6.5. Conclusions 
will be made in Section 6.6. 
6.2 Signed Digraph for Process Fault Detection and Diagnosis: A 
Literature Review 
6.2.1 The Original Signed Digraphfor Fault Diagnosis 
Iri et al. (1979) first proposed the idea of applying signed digraph (SDG) to process 
failure diagnosis. Since then, most works have been based on the modification of this idea, 
therefore it is useful to briefly introduce the method. A SDG graph is a network of nodes and 
directed arcs. A node represents a variable, and an are indicates the cause-effect (CE) 
relationship of variables. A sign of either 'Y' or "-" is attached to each arch representing a 
positive or negative effect. A node takes values from a qualitative value space, such as high, 
low and normal. For example, Fig. 6.1 shows a buffer tank configuration and Fig. 6.2 is its 
schematic representation of SDG digraph. 
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Fig. 6.1. The buffer tank (Iri et al., 1979). 
vi 
Fl 
Cý ........... 
V2 F2 L F3 V3 
Fig. 6.2. The SDG digraph for the buffer tank (Iri et al., 1979). 
Iri et al. (1979) have also developed a combined origin-scarching and depth-first 
reasoning algorithm, specifically for the purpose of process fault diagnosis. The method can 
be illustrated by reference to Figs. 6.1 and 6.2, and consists of the following steps. 
(1) According to the observed variables, the original values of nodes are given in Table 
6.1. In this partial pattern, Fl, F2 and F3 are the values of flow, which can be observed 
on the monitor, and L is the controlled variable. 
(2) Assume a sign for an unknown node and expand the partial pattern by adding a sign. 
To judge the sign of V3, three scenarios are possible. 
(3) Decompose a quasi-CE graph for the partial pattern into strongly-connected 
components and determine the partial order among them, as shown in Figs. 6.3a, b, & c. 
(4) Repeat Step 2 until all nodes are determined. 
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Table 6.1. The od&nal values of nodes. 
Fl vi L V2 F2 V3 F3 
0++ 
Fig. 6.3. Decompose a quasi-CE graph. 
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6. Z2 Development of SDG 
The original SDG proposed by Iri et al. (1979) is not a very efficient method due to 
some limitations. Consequently, new approaches have been developed by other researchers 
to improve it. The limitations of the original SDG can be summarised as follows: 
(1) In the original SDG and many later versions of it each node or variable can take values 
only from the value space of (-, 0, +), which is clearly insufficiently precise for many 
reasoning tasks. 
(2) Reasoning tasks can be classified into several categories such as fault diagnosis, 
operational supervision and simulation of behaviour. The reasoning algorithm of Tri et 
al. (1979) is only applicable to fault diagnosis. Complications arise in the later two 
occasions because ambiguous solutions can occur. This can be clearly illustrated which 
reference to the buffer tank problem of Iri et al. (1979), as shown in Figs. 6.1 and 6.2. 
When FC and LC controllers are in manual status, VI increases moderately, and V2 and 
V3 increase slightly, what direction will L move? From the SDG of Fig. 6.2, an 
ambiguous solution arises, as L is an uncertain value (i. e. the rate of change of L will be 
unknown). This can be seen more clearly in Fig. 6.4, where reasoning is in the direction 
of the arrows, when X2 is + and X3 is -. 
X2=+X3=- 
I 
Fig. 6.4. An ambiguous solution. 
(3) While the reasoning algorithm can be computerised, the conversion of variable 
values to qualitative values of +, 0 or - is a manual operation. In fact, the original 
SDG and many later versions of it are only suitable as an analytical too] that can 
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help tracing up and down the network for problem analysis. There is a clear need to 
convert numerical data into qualitative expressions automatically. 
(4) Most SDO models are unable to deal simultaneously with the uncertainty in data and in 
reasoning. 
(5) The original SDG and many later versions are not capable in handling interacting and 
recycle nodes, which arise due to control loops, recycle streams and inherent interaction 
of variables in processes. 
(6) The original and many later versions of SDG are only applicable to steady state 
processes. Some SDG extension methods have been proposed to deal with dynamics, 
but most are still not satisfactory. 
(7) In practice, drawing the digraph can be a very daunting task, particularly when the 
process is complex and interactions between variables are strong but only partially 
unknown. Most previous studies on SDG have also overlooked this issue. 
Despite the aforementioned limitations, SDG has still attracted considerable attention 
because it can handle incomplete models, functions with incomplete data, and most 
importantly, provide transparent and causal explanations to systems behaviour and make 
complex systems traceable. In fact, these limitations also provide the room for many 
continuous improvements. 
6. Z3 The ExtendedSDG 
Oyeleye and Kramer (1989) and Rose (1990) presented an Extended Signed 
Directed Graph (ESDG) for malfunction diagnosis in continuous processes. In an ESDG, 
certain non-physical feed forward paths can be included in the network that can explain 
inverse response and compensatory response in negative feedback loops. To develop an 
ESDO, quantitative models need to be converted to qualitative expressions. The ESDG 
method can only be applicable to processes at steady state. 
Ouassir and Melin (1997) have improved the ESDG method further by including all 
possible fault origins to the ESDO, which originally only represents the cause-effect 
relationships of variables. An example is represented in Fig. 6.5 and Eqns. (6.1) to (6.3). 
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Fig. 6.5. SDG with nodes representing faults. 
[xl] = -[x2] + [xO] - [leak] (6.1) 
[x2] = [xl] + [A] - [hlockage] (6.2) 
(6.3) 
6. Z4 Possible Cause -Effect Diagram 
Wilcox and Himmelblau (1994) developed the possible cause-effect graph (PCEG) 
method. The main difference of PCEG from SDG is that in PCEG a node represents an 
event, instead of a variable. Fig. 6.6 shows a simple example, which indicates a set of 
abnormal statements, such as T1 being H (high) and L (low), and TI reading being H (high) 
and L (low). A causal description for Fig. 6.6 is that TI reading being H can cause TI being 
H (other factors can also cause TI being H, TI Reading being H is just one of the possible 
factors leading to TI being H). It seems that the major drawback of the PCED method is that 
the digraph is often very congested and complex, because each variable can be expanded into 
a number of nodes. In comparison, a SDG digraph is simpler and more readable. 
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6. Z5 Fuzzy SDG 
TI Instrument Co 
TI Reading 
Go 
Co 
TI 
Fig. 6.6. A simple example of part of a PCED. 
Yu and Lee (199 1) have indicated that (+, 0 and -) are not sufficient in describing the 
relationship between two connected nodes and therefore introduced fuzzy membership 
functions into the branches so that the qualitative and quantitative reasoning can be 
combined. However, no such improvement has been made for the nodes. Gujima et al. 
(1993) introduced more than three values in the nodes in order to improve the accuracy in 
fault diagnosis, though fuzzy concepts were not used. The application of fuzzy concepts by 
Han et al. (1994) and Shih and Lee (1995) only have enabled the input nodes to convert 
numerical data to qualitative expression but the graph as a whole, is still a crisp one. Wang et 
al., (1995) have developed the most comprehensive method of fuzzy digraph, which takes 
the crisp SDG as a specific instance but it has far more features to overcome many of the 
limitations of a crisp SDG- 
Medan Medum 
=L. 1 
CL 
*F 
LOW Low Normal 
\W 
ý-1.0 ý0.6 ý0.3 
0.0 0.4 0.7 
High High 
9.30 0.60 1.0 
1.30 1.6 2.0 
Fig 6.7. An example of the fuzzy value space definition of a fuzzy variable 
(Wang et al., 1995). 
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Each node in a fuzzy-SDG is represented by a fuzzy variable. An "ample of the value 
space of a node is shown in Fig. 6.7. The number of ftizzy values covered by the fuzzy value 
space is determined by the problem requirement. It is worth noting that the method is not 
restricted to a three values pattern (-, 0, +). Every legal value of a node variable, such as high 
or medium high shown in Fig. 6.7 is a ftizzy set ýi defined by Eqn. (6.4). In Eqn. (6.4), x is an 
element of M and jt is the membership function. M is therefore, represented by its 
membership function, 14 such that the value of [t illustrates the degree of membership of the 
element x belonging to M. Whether a value ofx belongs to M depends on both the value of R 
and the I cut-value of M. The membership function, may take various shapes but the most 
common is the triangular and trapezoidal representation. Fig. 6.7 is a half-decline trapezoidal 
form. For the medium low in this figure, the membership value is calculated by Eqn. (6.5). 
/J=10,11 (6.4) 
m{ 
I o. 6 zv-, ai 
a2 -V 
a1 :5v :5 a2 
a2-ai 
0v>a or v<0.6 
Rxj+i 
e(xj+l-+xj)= Sj, j+l Rxj 
ai 
sj, j+l aj + 
gdxj / dt) 
sj, j+l Oxj +I 
(6.5) 
(6.6) 
(6.7) 
(6.8) 
A branch in a flizzy digraph is defined by the direction of the arrow and the effect 
strength. Suppose that xj+l and xj are two nodes linked by a branch directed from xj+l to xj, 
then the effect strength ofxj+l on xj is determined by Eqn. (6.6), in which Rxj+l and Rxj are 
the operational range of node xj+l and xj, respectively, and Sj, j+j is the sensitivity of xj to 
xj+,, determined by Eqn. (6.7). The operational range for a node consists of positive and 
negative ranges, corresponding to fuzzy values, v in the range [0,1] and [4,01. Obviously, 
the larger the value of e(xj+l -+ xj), the stronger the effect of rj+l on xj. If the relationship 
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uses a time derivative to account for the dynamics, this can be approximated using a 
backward difference. The sensitivity will be derived from the partial derivative estimated 
using the partial differential operator, with respect to the rate of change of the quantity as 
shown by Eqn. (6.8). In many situations the relationship between xj+l and xj is non-linear, 
while the partial derivatives are estimated by linear approximations. 
Since the publication of the method (Wang et al. 1995), it has further evolved over the 
years (Wang et al., 1996a, 1996b, 1997; Huang and Wang, 1999). The advantages are that 
this approach generates fewer ambiguous solutions. It can provide a more precise description 
of the variables than (-, 0 +), and produce a causal explanation. In particular, it allows 
reasoning in both arrow to and arrow from directions so that it can be used for different 
reasoning tasks, such as single and multiple fault diagnosis, operational supervision and 
simulation of operations. 
6.2 6 Digraphsfor Modelling Dynamic Behaviour 
Most studies on SDG have focused on processes at steady state. In applying SDG to 
modelling dynamic behaviour of a process, it is recognised that the most critical issue is to 
find a way to qualitatively represent a segment or a window of a dynamic trend (Fig. 6.8). 
In the early work of expert systems such as G2 (Moore and Kramer, 1986), simple 
descriptors were employed to describe dynamic trends, such as temperature increase or 
decrease. Later, other approaches were proposed for qualitative interpretation including 
the threshold value method (Lee et at., 1999), the episodes (Cheung and Stephanopoulos, 
1990a, 1990b; Bakshi and Stephanopoulos, 1994a, 1994b; Janusz and 
Venkatasubramanian, 1991) and the principal component analysis (Li and Wang, 2001). 
Fig. 6.9 illustrates the threshold method. Clearly, it is a relatively simple method but 
important information can be missing. 
Janusz and Venkatasubramanian (199 1) used nine primitives to represent any plots of 
a function. The method was further evolved to seven episodes as shown in Fig. 6.10. A 
dynamic trend of a variable in a windowed time scale is a series of episodes when grouped 
together so that they can capture the feature of the trend. Cheung and Stephanopoulos 
(1990a, 1990b) developed a similar approach, which makes use of seven primitive triangles 
to describe a trend. 
f 
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Fig. 6.8. The temporal behaviour (i. e., trend) of a variable in a window time scale. 
Fig. 6.9. Illustration of threshold method for qualitative interpretation of dynamic 
trends. HL - high limit, LL - low limit. 
These original episode based methods suffer from being weak in dealing with the 
adverse effect of noises. As a result, Bakshi and Stephanopoulos (1994ab) further developed 
the triangular approach by introducing the wavelets based multi-scale signal analysis 
technique. Wavelets multi-scale analysis is able to eliminate the noise components, and at 
the same time, automatically identify the inflection points of a trend signal. An inflection 
point is considered as the connection of two episodes. For example, the three trends in Fig. 
6.11 can be converted to: 
x, = [B CD AD AB C] 
x2 = [B CD AB CD AB C] 
x3 = [B CD AD AB C] (6.9) 
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In addition, the discrimination and clustering of trends is not straightforward. The 
triangular episode representation is further used to develop inductive rules for product 
quality monitoring. An example of such rules is "if the trend follows (... AB CD AD AB 
... ), the batch run is likely to be bad", where AB, CD, A, D and AB are different episodes. It 
is clear that the level of cognition of such a description is still not very high. Furthermore, 
the episode method has never been applied to SDG. 
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Fig. 6.10 The seven episodes. 
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Li and Wang (2001) developed a fuzzy clustered method for qualitative modelling of 
process temporal behaviour. A new method for qualitative interpretation of dynamic trends 
was also proposed, which was based on PCA. The method can be illustrated using Fig. 6.12. 
The 75 process variable trends in a widow time scale of a size of 80 sampling points is 
used to form a matrix of 7540. The method involves processing the data matrix using 
principal component analysis (PCA). Plotting the first two principal components gives three 
clusters, i. e., A, B and C (Fig. 6.12). Similarly, for the variable L, the dynamic trends are 
also grouped into three clusters, i. e. D, E and F in the PCI-PC2 plan. Rules can be easily 
generated for this simple case, 
IFFj =A THEN L-D 
IFFi =B THEN L=E 
IFFI =C THEN L=F 
Comparing to previous methods, the approach of Li and Wang (2001) allows simple 
but rigorous qualitative/quantitative representation of the temporal trends of individual 
variables. 
Co 
Ile 
'13 
In addition to the qualitative representation of dynamic trend signals, another 
challenge to qualitative dynamic simulation of process temporal behaviour is how to perform 
112 
reasoning when there are interacting and recycle nodes in a digraph. Wang and Li (2001) 
have solved the problem using a concept of the node clusters, i. e., to treat a cluster of 
interacting or/and recycle nodes as a single node in the reasoning. This can be illustrated 
using Fig. 6.13 and Table 6.2. As an example, the reasoning rules generated from the digraph 
of Fig. 6.13 and the data set I of Table 6.2 are 
IFXI=AandX6=A THEN (X2=B and X3=A and X4ýC) 
IFX2=BTHENXs=C 
Li and Wang (2001) also introduced fuzzy concept to the fiizzy digraph so that it can 
be used for combined qualitative/quantitative temporal reasoning. 
Table 6.2 An Example Data Collection for Illustrating the Reasoning 
Mechanism. 
Data case X, X2 X3 X4 X5 X6 
1 A B A C C A 
2 B A B B A C 
3 C C C A B B 
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Fig 6.12. Categorical characterisation of dynamic trends using PCA. 
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Fig. 6.13. A cluster of interacting and recycle nodes. 
6.3 Observations on the Fuzzy Digraph Method for Temporal 
Behaviour Modelling 
6.3.1 Qualitative Interpretation of Dynamic Trends 
The PCA based method for qualitative interpretation of dynamic trends is found to be 
unable to identify a spike or a sudden change in the dynamic trend. This can be shown with 
the aid of Figs. 6.14 and 6.15. Fig. 6.14 shows 75 dynamic trend cases of a. variable (the flow 
rate of the feed to a CSTR reactor), each with 80 sampling points. These trends clearly 
represent three operation modes, denoted by b, c and a. 
As an example, a spike is introduced into one case (data case no. 25) of the c 
operational mode, as shown in Fig. 6.14. Using the method of Li and Wang (2001), the 
corresponding PCI-PC2 plot is shown in Fig. 6.15. Clusters b, c, and a, correspond to b, c 
and a, in Fig. 6.14. Clearly the PC I -PC2 plot does not show any trace of the spike because 
the spike affect is negligible and buried by other values affects. The spike sample is grouped 
together with other values in cluster c (the spike sample is represented as red colour in the 
green cluster c). 
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Fig. 6.14 CSTR feed dynanaic trends with a spike introduced in case 25. 
Fig. 6.15 PC I -PC2 plan plot of the dynamic trends of Fig. 6.14. 
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6.3.2 Clustering of the PCI-PC2 Plots 
In Fig. 6.12, grouping of the data points in the PCI-PC2 plots is straightforward. 
However in some cases, it can be difficult to decide to which cluster a specific data case 
should be assigned. Li and Wang (2001) proposed to use ftizzy c-means to automatically 
assign data cases to clusters. The fuzzy c-means clustering is an iterative pattern recognition 
approach, which is based on the fuzzy set theory (Friedman and Kandel, 1999; Bezdek, 
19 8 1). Given m data cases (xi, x2, ..., x. ), each data case xj is described by n attributes, and 
the m data cases are supposed to be partitioned into C clusters. The data case belongs to a 
specific cluster and is determined by the Euclidean distance and the fuzzy membership 
values. 
For a cluster Cj which is centredatyl, the Euclidean distance jjxj-yjjj between xjandyi is 
dy = Jýxj-yjjj , 1: 5 i --5 c, 1: 5 j :5m (6.10) 
The fuzzy membership value ofxj belonging to C, is defined by, 
Oij = 
dy 
,1 :5i-. 5 C, 1 .9j-. 5 M 
[ktl( 
dkj 
) 21(, 6-1 1-1 
(6.11) 
where P is a tuning parameter, which controls the degree of fuzziness in the 
clustering process, provided that dkj *0 for all 1: 5 1: 5 c. If dkj = 0, OU =1 is defined. 
Another observation on the fuzzy c-means based clustering of the PCI-PC2 plane was 
identified to be not accurate. For two points in the same cluster, as long as their fuzzy 
membership values are equal to each other, they are treated the same, such as the points I 
and 2 in Fig. 6.16. 
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Fig. 6.16. Points I and 2 have equal value of fuzzy membership and belong 
to the same cluster. 
This argument can be illustrated further with reference to the particular case study of 
the CSTR reactor. Fig. 6.17 shows the PCI-PC2 plot of the CSTR reactant feed flow 
transients. The plot shows that there are four clusters. Both samples 364 and 370 belong to 
cluster 3 (the red cluster) and have very close fuzzy membership values, i. e., almost equal 
distances to the cluster centre. However, their relative positions are important. Fig. 6.18 
shows the PCI-PC2 plot when the process reached new steady states. It is clearly shows that 
Samples 364 and 370 are in different steady states. It is also a clear indication that the fuzzy 
c-means approach gives insufficient information. Consequently, a new method using the idea 
of sectioning is needed and its development is given in Section 6.4. 
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Fig. 6.17 PC's plot of dynamic trend reactant feed flow in CSTR process. 
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Fig. 6.18 PC's plot of final steady state temporal behaviour of the process. 
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6.4 A New Digraph Method for Qualitative Modelling of Process 
Dynamic Behaviour 
The proposed method can be considered as an extension to the method developed by 
Li and Wang (200 1) in the following aspects. 
(1) A more accurate method is proposed for qualitative representation of dynamic trend 
signal in a windowed time scale. The method is based on clustering of PCI and PC2 
plane and sectioning of each cluster. 
(2) A procedure in determining the number of clusters and sections in each PCI and PC2 
plane is proposed. This is a global method because it depends on the overall 
performance of the system. It is a different approach from the localised method of Li 
and Wang (2001). 
(3) The proposed method is also extended to model the dynamic behaviour of the combined 
process-operator interacting system. 
6.4.1 Qualitative Representation of the Dynamic Trends Based on Clustering and 
Sectioning ofPCIs Plots 
We use Fig. 6.19 to illustrate the approach. Fig. 6.19 shows nine hundred trends of the 
concentration of the outlet stream of a CSTR reactor, each trend is composed of ninety 
sampling points. As the first step of the method, principal component analysis (PCA) is 
applied to the data matrix of 900 * 90. The results showed that the first two principal 
components (PCs) captured 97% of the variability. The fuzzy c-means clustering technique 
is then applied. The four clusters are shown in Fig. 6.20 using different colours. Fig. 6.20 
also shows that these clusters are sectioned into forty-eight sections. These are calculated 
from the centre of each cluster, the maximum and the minimum of PCI and PC2 of each 
cluster, the quadrants of the cluster, and the ratio of PCI and PC2. Compared with the 
approach of Li and Wang (2001) in which only the number of the clusters is used for 
qualitative representation of temporal behaviour of a process variable, the current method 
can improve the accuracy and the resolution of qualitative representation of dynamic trends. 
The sectioning technique also improves the consistency of the data and minimises chances of 
rules conflict. 
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Fig. 6.19 Concentration of the output stream of the CSTR reactor. 
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6.4.2 Number of Clusters and Sections 
The method for qualitative representation of dynainic trends requires determination of 
the number of clusters and sections. Ideally, given the performance measure, an optimisation 
algorithm should be used for this purpose. In this study an empirical procedure is used. The 
procedure is shown in Fig. 6.21 and surnmarised in the following steps: 
(1) Draw the diagraph. 
(2) Apply PCA to the dynamic trends of all variables and draw the PCI-PC2 plots. 
(3) Define the number of clusters and sections using rules-of-thumb method. 
(4) Setting the flag to one. If the flag equals to one change is allowed on the number of 
clusters. If the flag is set to zero, change is allowed on number of sections. 
(5) Build the rules using the digraph and PCI-PC2 plots and their clusters and sections. 
(6) Minimise the number of rules by removing the duplicated rules. Rules with the same IF 
condition and THEN statements will be combined. 
(7) Detect for conflict rules, i. e., rules that have identical IF condition parts, but different 
THEN statements. If the number of conflicting rules is greater than an acceptable value, 
check the flag. If the flag equals to one, increase the number of clusters by one. If the 
flag equals to zero, increase the number of sections. 
(8) Model validation. Applying the model developed from training data to test data for 
validation purpose. If the number of validation data cases that can be predicted correctly 
is acceptable, the model is accepted. Otherwise the number of clusters and sections need 
to be redefined. 
The above procedure is a global method because the number of clusters and sections 
are determined based on the overall performance of the system. In this case the performance 
of the qualitative model is the number of data cases that can be correctly predicted. 
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Fig. 6.21 The Procedure for selecting the numbers of clusters and sections. 
6.4.3 Modelling the Dynamic Behaviour of a Combined Process-Operator 
Interaction System 
The proposed method is applied to model the dynamic behaviour of the joint process- 
operator system of a CSTR operation (the CSTR flow sheet is shown in Fig. 3.5). Three 
variables are used as disturbances, including the feed concentration Ca - 
in, the feed 
temperature T_in and the cooling water temperature Twin. Six variables were recorded as 
state variables, including feed flow rate F_in, product flow rate F_out, product temperature 
T_out, product concentration Ck_put, reactor level Icstr and cooling water flow rate Fwin. 
The qualitative interpretation approach of dynamic trends was applied to the six state 
variables F_in. F_out, Ca_out, 1ý_out, L_cstr and Fwin. As an example, the PCI-PC2 plots 
for T_out and Ca out shown in Fig. 6.22 (a) & (b). The PCI-PC2 plots T_out and Ca-out 
are each divided into three clusters and forty-eight sections. 
When the operators stop intervention and the process reaches the new steady state, the 
steady state values of the six state variables, F-in, F_out, Ca_out, T-out, L-cstr and Fwin are 
processed by PCA to get the operational states of the process, as plotted in Fig. 6.22 (c). it 
also shows three clusters and forty-eight sections. Using inductive learning, a rule can be 
obtained as follows: 
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IF F_in( cluster - section =? ) 
and F_out( cluster ?, section 
and C-out( cluster = ?, section =? ) 
THEN Process-Operation_State( cluster = ?, section =? ) 
Purely for illustrative purpose, we only considered T_out and C-Out in the IF part of 
the rules. Then the rules can be summarised as in Table 6.3. The first rule in Table 6.3 in 
Prolog format is: 
Rule(1,43,2,41): - 
End_clust--3, End_sec=33, 
Output-Result(EnLclust, End_esct). 
In plain English the rule is: 
IF T_out( cluster = 1, section = 43) 
and Ca_out( cluster = 2, section =4 1) 
THEN Process-End_State( cluster = 3, section = 33). 
Where the last statement indicates the process steady state location in term of the 
cluster and the section. 
The three disturbances Ca_in, T-in and Twin are changed independently as well as in 
combination, and not all the changes are step changes. Therefore in order to derive rules to 
identify the disturbances from the qualitative values of the state variables, clustering of the 
disturbances is also necessary, Fig. 6.22 (d) shows the clustering of the three disturbances, in 
three clusters and forty-eight sections. According to Table 6.3, the first rule to identify the 
location of disturbances is, in Prolog format, 
Rule(1,43,2,4 I): - 
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Dist-clust = 1, Dist-sect = 17, 
Outprut-result( Dist-clust, Dist-sect). 
or IF T_out( cluster = 1, section = 43) 
and Ca_out( cluster = 2, section =4 1) 
THEN Disturbance( cluster = 1, section = 17). 
The last statement is the output of the disturbance location. 
The quantitative data of process variables for a particular process state or behaviour 
can also be calculated from the loading matrix and the sections coordinates (Table 6.4). 
Hence, this method allows reconstruction of the process variables values. 
Table 6.3. Clusters and sections of the first 8 cases. 
T out Ca out End-c Dist-c 
Cluster 
Number 
Section 
Number 
Cluster 
Number 
Section 
Number 
Cluster 
Number 
Section 
Number 
Cluster 
Number 
Section 
Number 
1 43 2 41 3 33 1 17 
1 27 2 26 3 4 1 3 
1 32 2 8 3 4 1 47 
1 42 2 42 1 12 1 21 
1 37 2 38 1 35 1 44 
1 43 2 40 3 33 1 16 
1-1 21 2 1 1 1 11 1 7 
1 6 2 81 3 4 1 46 
Table 6.4. Section of three coordinate values used as quantitative represent. 
Cluster Section PCI PC2 PCI PC2 PCI PC2 
1 1 2.1820 -2.5993 3.5130 -2.5993 3.5130 -2.0393 
1 4 2.1820 . 2.5993 3.5130 -2.0393 2.1820 -2.0393 
1 7 2.1820 -2.5993 2.1820 -2.0393 1.8585 -2.0393 
1 10 2.1820 . 2.5993 1.8585 -2.0393 1.8585 -2.5993 
1 13 2.1820 -2.5993 1.8585 -2.5993 1.8585 -3.5072 
1 16 2.1820 . 2.5993 1.8585 -3.5072 2.1820 . 3.5072 
1 19 2.1820 -2.5993 2.1820 -3.5072 3.5130 . 3.5072 
1 22 2.1820 . 2.5993 3.5130 -3.5072 , 
3.5130 -2.5993 
2 1 . 0.5683 -0.2620 -0.3837 -01620 
1 -0.3837 
=Zý2 
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Fig. 6.22 The PC I -PC2 plots the dynamic trends of T_out (a) and Ca_out (b), the state of 
the process (c) and the disturbances (d). 
Fig. 6.23 shows the screen-shot of the combined proccss-operator interaction dynamic 
behaviour simulation. The predicted position of the steady state condition is found in cluster 
one and section twenty-four, as shown in Fig. 6.23. A digraph of the If statement is 
represented as "clusters and sections of T_out and Ca_in" and the Then condition is 
represented as "clusters and sections of end caridition and dimrbances". Tbe present 
condition of the process operation and the proposed action are shown at the end of the 
digraph. 
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"rC2 
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6.5 Other Methods of Cluster Sectioning 
Other shapes and methods can be used for dividing a cluster into regions. Figures 6.24 
(a), (b) and (c) show these alternatives. 
Ellipse shape of clustering and sectioning (Fig. 6.24 (a)). Specific numerical numbers or 
alphabetical characters can be used to identify each section. Each sample or case location can 
be found by calculating the boundary of each section. 
Vertical line of cluster sectioning (Fig. 6.24 (b)). The shape is ideal for PC I -PC2 plan 
cluster sectioning, especially when PC I represents 90% or more of the variability of the data. 
Where the consistency of the data will be controlled by the x-axis. The accuracy of the rules 
depends on the number of vertical division lines. More vertical division can achieve more 
accurate rules. 
Box shape of cluster sectioning (Fig. 6.24 (c)). This shape is ideal for PC I -PC2 plan cluster 
sectioning, especially when the variability of the data is divided between PC I and PC2. The 
data consistency in this case depends on the x and y axes. The accuracy of the rule base 
model will depend on the size of boxes. Smaller boxes more accurate rules. 
Fuzq membership function method of cluster sectioning. A slight change can be added to 
fuzzy c-mean clustering. The new function will give two extra outputs, which represent the 
quadrant position of the case or data point as 'Y'and "-" sign. As an example, (0.85,1-1,1+1), 
which means the case membership function has a value of 0.85 and located in the second 
quadrant of the cluster. For more accurate rules, a number of ellipses. can be used as a 
boundary limit for the membership function. For example, the closest ellipse to the cluster 
centre represents a 0.9 membership function and the furthest ellipse represents a 0.4 
membership function. 
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Fig. 6.24 Alternative methods of cluster sectioning, 
(a) ellipse, (b) vertical and (c) box shapes. 
6.6 Summary 
A critical review has been made on digraph methods for qualitative modelling of 
process behaviour and fault diagnosis. Most of the methods were developed for steady-state 
situation. Based on the observations on the methods of a new approach for qualitative 
/quantitative modelling of the temporal behaviour of combined operator-process systems is 
proposed in this chapter. 
The method involves the following steps: 
(1) Drawing the digraph based on knowledge of the process. 
(2) Combining statistical techniques with joint operator-process simulation to 
generate data for model development and validation. 
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(3) Qualitative interpretation of the temporal behaviour of all the individual 
variables using PCI-PC2 plots of principal component analysis. Fuzzy c- 
means is used to cluster the PCI-PC2 plots and each cluster is further 
sectioned. 
(4) The operational state is also clustered and sectioned. 
(5) Automatic generation of rules describing the reasoning mechanism in the 
digraph and the conditions leading to abnormal operation regions. 
(6) The method is developed forjoint operator-process simulation system. 
An iterative procedure for determining the number of clusters and sections is also 
presented. 
The main features of the new method are, (a) the sectioning method overcomes the 
ambiguity problem of previous methods, (b) the accuracy and the resolution of the 
qualitative rules is increased, and (c) it can be applied to joint operator-process simulation 
systems. 
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Chapter 7 
Applications and Case Studies 
7.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, the method developed in chapter 6 for qualitative/quantitative 
modelling of process temporal behaviour is applied to the joint operator-process simulation 
of a CSTR reactor. The purpose is to demonstrate the procedure of model development and 
validation. As indicated in chapter 6, ideally the numbers of clusters and sections should be 
calculated using mathematical optimisation. In practice, this is very complicated, therefore 
an iterative method was proposed. The numbers of clusters and sections were determined by 
trading-off the global performance measure in terms of accuracy and simplicity of the rules. 
The models were first developed using training data and then validated using test data. A 
systematic procedure for validating the model and feedback of the validation result to model 
revision is described in detail in this chapter. 
7.2 Generation of Validation Data 
The procedure of generating the training and validation data is shown in Fig. 7.1 and 
can be surnmarised in the follow steps: 
(1) Set the initial conditions, such as the mean (g) and standard deviations (std) for each 
disturbance. These values can be assigned through the interface of the interaction 
model. The mean and the standard deviation for the three disturbances of the CSTR 
reactor, i. e., C-in, T-in and Twin are: tt=[2 340 3 10] and std-- [0.6 10 10]. 
(2) Use the mean g and the standard deviation std to generate disturbances, which will be 
applied to the CSTR simulator. Using the mean It and the standard deviation sid and a 
random number generator, ninety disturbances are generated in this study. 
(3) Apply all disturbances to the CSTR reactor simulator. For each data case, the simulator 
always starts from normal. operation. 
(4) organize the validation data and add white noise. White noise normal distributed with 
zero mean. 
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7.3 The Validation Procedure of Qualitative Models 
(1) 
The validation procedure is shown in Fig. 7.2 and summarised in the following steps: 
Load all the data that is obtained in the model training stage and is required for the 
validation process, including the mean, standard deviations, cluster centres and 
sections, Max/Min values for PC2 and PC I ratios, and loading matrices. 
(2) Use the above data obtained in model training stage to process the validation data, and 
so plot the validation data on the PC I -PC2 planes. 
(3) Check if all the validation data falls within the clusters and sections of the training 
data. If a validation data case goes outside, it should be removed from the validation 
data. This consideration is similar to feedforward neural network that can guarantee 
correctness and accuracy only if the new data falls within the training data space. This 
limitation can be overcome through extensive training using data covering various 
scenarios. 
Calculate the distance of all validation data from the cluster centres. 
(5) Also assign validation data cases to specific sections. Construct a matrix to represent 
the assignments of all validation data cases to clusters and sections. 
(6) Identify the cases of the validation data that can be correctly predicted using the rules 
obtained at the training stage. 
(7) Check the closeness of the clusters and sections predicted by the rule-based models 
and the true locations. 
Calculate the quantitative values from the qualitative predictions. This will make use 
of the section coordinates of PC I and PC2 and the loading matrix. 
(9) Create a residual error plot (Fig. 7.3) with 95% confidence intervals on the residual 
errors using the value of the process variables produced in step (8) and the actual 
values. The outlier cases, which are outside the 95% confidence limits, can be clearly 
visualised in red colour. The one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) is carried out for 
each final temporal state of process variables calculated in step (8) and the actual 
process variables of the validation data. Then create a box and whisker plot for each 
variable (Fig. 7.4). 
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7.4 One-Way Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) 
ANOVA is used to determine if the data from different groups has a common mean 
or they are actually different in the measured characteristics. ANOVA is a simple but special 
case of the linear model and has a form of- 
yiFct-j + cij (7.1) 
where yij is a matrix of observations, CE. j is a matrix whose columns are the group means 
(the I dot j' notation means that CE applies to all rows of the j th column), and Cij is the matrix 
of the random disturbances. The value of an element in the column of y is the sum of a 
constant and a value from a random disturbance. 
The results of each case study tabulated in tables are known as ANOVA tables. The 
construction of an ANOVA table can be demonstrated using Table 7.1, which shows all 
equations required to carry out ANOVA calculation. ýi are the estimated values of the 
model, yi are the actual observation values, and Y are the means of the observation values. 
The F-Factor is used for null hypothesis test, to see if the means of the columns are identical. 
A p-value will return by the hypothesis test, which will be examined during the case studies. 
If a p-value is closed to zero, it is a doubtful case with respect to the null hypothesis and 
indicates that the means of the columns are different. ANOVA Table divides the variability 
of the data into two parts. The first part is the variability due to diffe. rences among the 
column means. The second part is the variability due the differences between the data in 
each column and column mean. 
The box plots produced from the ANOVA test are used to confirm the results from 
the ANOVA tests by displaying the means of the estimated and the observed values, and the 
data spread from the means. The box has lines showing the lower quartile, median and upper 
quartile. The whiskers are lines extending from each end of the box to show the extent of the 
rest of the data. Outliers are data with values beyond the end of the whiskers. 
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Fig. 7.3. A plot of the residuals with error bars represented 81 cases of the final process 
steady state conditions identified by the qualitative rules. 
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Fig. 7.4. 'Me box plot for the actual validation values and the model calculated values showing 
the data spread from the mean. 
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Table 7.1. A tvt)ical ANOVA Table. 
Source Sum of Square 
(SS) 
Degree of 
Freedom (df) 
Mean Square (MS) F-Factor 
_Eolumns T-ui-Y), I MSd=SS. Vdf MS. imsp 
Error gyi_ýi)2 n-2 MSe=SSE/df 
Total X(yi _y)2 n-I I I I 
7.5 Validation of Rules for predicting Process's Temporal States 
There are two parts in the study. The first part is to deal with the final temporal state 
of the process by identifying the location of the process operation in terms of clusters and 
sections. In the second part, the accuracy of the process variables estimated value by the 
quantitative methodology is examined using statistical technique. Fig. 7.5 shows the plots 
representing the dynamic trends of six variables with modulated noise. Nine hundred data 
cases were used for rules generation. Their qualitative characterisation is shown in Fig. 7.6. 
The figure contains seven plots. Six plots represent the qualitative characterisation of the 
variables and the seventh plot represents the process's temporal states. Qualitative rules are 
extracted from those plots in terms of clusters and sections as illustrated in Table 7.2. The 
alphabets c and s denoted to cluster and section, respectively. The rules generated from the 
900 training cases are to be validated using ninety validation cases. T- Out, Ca - 
Out, F- in, 
F_out, L_cstr and Fwin (Table 7.2) are considered. Their clusters and sections tag number 
are used as the IF statement to predict the THEN part of the process final steady state 
conditions. Table 7.2 shows the process columns and Fig. 7.6 displays the final plot. 
It was found that eighty-one out of the ninety validation cases were identified by the 
rules obtained from the training. The quantitative values of these cases are also calculated 
using the procedure introduced in Section 7.3. The quantitative data, which represents the 
final process state variables values, are analysed using ANOVA test. The residuals are 
plotted following the order of the case numbers as shown in Fig. 7.3 and the 95% confidence 
intervals of these residuals are plotted as effor bars. The outlier cases are clearly shown in 
red. Their coffesponding error bars do not cross the zero reference line. 
The F-factor is used in the hypothesis test to confirm if the values of the calculated 
process variables are identical to the actual validation process variables. A Nvalue shows the 
result after the hypothesis test. For the best fit, it is expected to have a F-factor of zero and a 
Nvalue of one. Three ANOVA Tables for the identified cases are shown in Tables 7.3 to 7.5. 
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Fig. 7.5. 'Me CSTR operation trends for all variables, each plot contains 900 trends and each 
trend represents 90 samples. 
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Fig. 7.6. The PCI-PC2 planes showing six inputs used as the IF conditions and one output 
used as the THEN statement of the qualitative rules. 
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Table 7.2. The first 10 qualitative rules represented by clusters and sections. ' 
IF THEN 
T out Ca-out Fwin F-In F-Put L_cstr Process 
Rule C S C S C S C S C S CI S C S 
1 1 18 2 37 1 28 1 28 1 1 2 8 8 19 
- 2 1 45 2 43 1 29 2 21 1 22 2 7 9 48 
3 1 26 2 2 1 47 2 15 2 2 1 7 2 33 
4 1 32 21 12 1 48 1 35 2 1 25 1 1 7 2 10 
_ 5 1 42 2 42 , 1 30 1 1 19 1 22 2 17 8 20 _ 6 1 37 2 38 1 6 2 4 1 1 2 17 8 43 
7 1 . 21 2 40 1 27 1 20 1 1 2 16 8 8 
8 1 43 2 43 1 27 2 21 1 22 1 9 9 48 
9 1 21 2 40 1 27 2 21 1 1 21 16 8 33 
10 1 48 21 18 1 2 41 1 6 1 1 11 17 9 43 
T refers to cluster number and S refers to section number. 
Table 7.3. The ANOVA table showing the product temperature and concentration. ' 
Variable T out Ca out 
Source SS df MS F SS df NIS F 
Columns 39.13e-3 1 39.13e-3 72.66e4 2.74e-5 I 2.74e-5 10.74e. 3 
Error 861.6 160 5.386 0.4084 160 25.52e-4 
Total 861.6 161 0.4084 161 
-P-Value 0.9322 0.9176 
'(SS) some of square, (dj) degree offreedom and (MS) mean square. 
Table 7.4. The ANOVA table showing the reactor feed and product flow rates! 
Variable F_in F out 
Source SS df 
_MS " -F 
SS df MS F 
Columns 15. ý3e 1 15.937 33.097 15.05e 1 1-5: 0657 -Yi. l7e7r 
Error 0.7701 160 48.13e"4 0.7724 160 48.28e74 
Total 0.7717 161 0.7739 161 
P-1 0 . 5659 0.5774 
"(SS) som of square. (dj) degree offreedom and (MS) mean square. 
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Table 7.5 The ANOVA Table showing the reactor level and cooling water flow rate. ' 
Variable L_cstr I Fwin 
Source SS df NIS F SS I df NIS F 
24.34e' Columns 2434c*2 1P 4 53e 15.28e7 1 15.2&-' 18.116,2 
Error 112.8 160 70.49e7 2 1350 160 84.396" 
Total 113 161 1352 161 
P-Value 0.5576 0.6710 
'(SS) some ofiquare, (dj) degree offreedom and (MS) mean square. 
Table 7.3 shows that the T_out and Ca_out estimations are very good since the F- 
factors for both variables are very small and the P-values are over 0.9, which is close to one. 
This indicates that the F statistic is as extreme as the observed F, which would have a chance 
of occurrence about nine out of ten if both the actual and predicted values were equal. This 
has been confirmed by the top two box plots in Fig. 7.4, which show that the variables of 
T_out and Ca_out of the validation data have almost the same number of data spread as that 
determined by the model. The other ANOVA Tables for F_in, F_out, 1ý_cstr and Fwin 
variables also show good results, but comparatively lower than that of T_out and Ca-out 
variables data, since the Nvalues indicate that F statistic that is as extreme as the observed F 
would occur by chance about six out of ten if both the actual and predicted values were truly 
equal. The box plots of the four variables is shown in Fig. 7.4 and they look less promising 
than the T_out and Ca_out box plot specially L-Cstr variable, which shows that the actual 
validation values spread along the value axis while the prediction focus around its mean 
value. 
The next case study is to increase the number of IF condition statement (refer to Table 
7.2) of the qualitative rules from six to ten elements. The number of cases identified by the 
qualitative rules reduced from eighty-one to twenty-one. This indicates that the model is 
over-fitted. For example, by fitting the system too close to the training data, it will lose its 
ability to improve the fitting of the system to the validation or checking data. This situation 
usually occurs in ftizzy logic when the model has been trained for a long time (the number of 
epoch is very large). Hence, the error from the training data will be the least while that from 
the checking data will be large, and it is higher than that when a shorter model training time 
is applied. The over-fit situation also occurs in neural network methodology. When the 
number of neurons in the hidden layers increases, the neural network model is forced to 
represent the training data only but not the model. The P-values of ANOVA in Tables 7.6 to 
7.8 of this case study become lower than the previous one, which confirms the over-fitting. 
) 
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The residual plots with 95% confidence for the twenty-one predicted cases are 
shown in Fig. 7.7 (for the final process steady state variables). The outlier cases are less than 
the previous case study because the number of cases identified by the qualitative rules is only 
one third of the previous case study. The ANOVA Tables 7.6 to 7.8 and the box plots in Fig. 
7.8 indicate that the results are less promising than the previous case study because of the 
over-fit phenomena. It proves that the current proposed method is different from the normal 
rule-base situation, where when the number of IF statement elements increase (more 
description in the rule statement) the prediction of the conditions will be more accurate. For 
the purpose of illustration, an example of rules to predict if an animal is an elephant is given 
bellow, 
IF animal huge four-footed, 
And animal thick-skinned, 
And animal ivory tusks, 
And animal long trunk, 
Then animal is elephant. 
The above rule can only predict the type of the animal but will not distinguish if the 
elephant is from Africa or Asia. Therefore an extra statement to enhance the rule is required. 
Fig. 7.8 shows the box plots for all the flnal process variable's states. F out and F_in 
have the lowest values of the P-value and the highest values of the Mact. or, which indicate 
that the estimated data are not identical to the validation data. The box plots of the F- out and 
F_in confirm this finding since the estimated data spread along the value axis while the 
actual values (column one) focus around the mean. 
144 
Fig. 7.7. Plots of the residuals with error bars representing 21 cases of the fmal process 
steady state condition idcnfified by the qualitative rules. 
Table 7.6. ANOVA tables fixproduct temperature aW concentration. 
Variable T 
-out 
Ca_out 
Source SS df AB F SS df 
- 
MS F 
columns 17.3le' I 17.3le 51.45d4 47.09e4 1 47.09c*6 33.28e3 
Error 134.6 40 3.364 0.05661 40 14.15e4 
Total 1 134.6 41 0.05666 41 
P-Value 1 0 . 9432 
1 
0.8562 
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Table 7.7. ANOVA tables for reactor feed flow and product flow. 
Variable F_in F-out 
Source SS 
- 
df 
- 
NIS 
- 
F SS df NIS F 
Columns 57.3ie7l I 57 T . 
32c7 4.655 54.7 c75 8 1 54.78e -T4-2 
Error 49.26e 40 12.3 1 c" 49.58e 40 
Total 0.7717 41 55.06e 41 
P-Value 0 . 037 
0.0419 
7.8. ANOVA tables for reactor level and cooling water flow. 
Variable L_cstr Fwin 
Source SS df MS F 
- 
SS df NIS 
-- - 
F 
- - - - Columns Il. l2e7T I 11.12e . 
ýO4 d' . 046' 3.75e7 
3.75e7l I : T3 75J j5 qT3 d r 
Error 1931 40 48.2ge 82.91 40 2.073 
Total 113 41 83.44 41 
P-Value 0.6339 1 0.6134 
However, by reducing the number of sections from forty-eight to twenty four 
during the development of the qualitative model will improve the number of predicted 
cases and also the model estimation of the final process steady state variables. Fig. 7.9 
shows the PCI-PC2 plane, the clusters and the sections of all process variables 
employed in the case study. Each process variable has two clusters and twenty four 
sections, while the final steady state condition has nine clusters and twenty four 
sections. The region of each sections increased (in term of area) so that each region will 
hold more data points. The residual plots are shown in Fig. 7.10 with 95% confidence 
intervals. These plots show fifty five cases identified from the ninety cases of the 
validation data. The ANOVA Tables are shown in Tables 7.9 to 7.11 and the box plots 
are shown in Fig. 7.11. Both the ANOVA Tables and the box plots indicate that the 
qualitative model has been improved and the estimation of quantitative values of the 
final process variable becomes more accurate. However, it is not more accurate than 
the first case study where if statement elements are the three variables of T-out, C-oUt 
and Fwin as shown in Table 7.2. 
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Fig. 7.8. Box plots for the actual validation values (column 1) and the model calculated 
values (column2) showing data spread from the mean. 
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Fig. 7.9. The PC I -PC2 planes for the six inputs and One Output Of the qualitative model using 
twcnty-four sections. 
148 
The above case studies indicate that the proposed methodology is flexible. For 
example, changing the number of IF statement elements will modify the accuracy of the 
qualitative model prediction and affect the number of cases falling within the model. 
Since each cluster and section has a specific number and identification, Figs. 7.6 and 7.9 
can be used to visualize the type of process operation conditions during any analysis. For 
example, using GUI interactive tools will allow users to investigate the type of the 
process operation conditions for each cluster and section. This is done by moving the 
mouse to the area of interest, so that the system can display the process operation 
condition at that particular region. Or, by supplying the data, such as the process variables 
trend, the system will then show the predicted region of the overall process variables and 
show the type of process operation conditions clearly on the screen. The human operator 
or the operator model can use this useful information, in conjunction with other data and 
knowledge yielded by the human operator/process interaction model, such as the type of 
disturbances, to make the correct decision during abnormal conditions. The operation 
status could be as a result of the human operator model action during execution of 
specific procedures or actions. 
Table 7.9. ANOVA tables for product temperature and concentration. 
Variable T 
-out 
Ca-out 
Source ss df Ms 
- 
F 
-- -- ' 
ss df Ms F 
Columns 38.9le I 38.9le' a48c: 4 537er 14.6 -l -l-46-3-e=7 -517 63T 
Error 651.7 108 6.034 i06.58J 108 28.32d4 
Total 651.8 109 0.306 109 
Fp-value 1 0.9361 0 
. 
8206 
Table 7.10. ANOVA tables for reactor feed and vroduct flow. 
Variable F_in F Put 
Source SS df NIS F SS df NIS F 
Columns 47.36e I 47.366's 7443 43A. 496 s 
j 
1 43.496 0.4054' 
Error 7T 11.55e 
- 
10.657 1.596. I. 11.596,2 108 10.73674 
Total 1 T 11.59e7 109 . 1.63C 11.636' 109 
1.5071 0.5257 
Table 7.11 ANOVA tables for reactor level and cooling water flow. 
Variable L_cstr Fwin 
Source SS df MS 
- 
F 
- - 
SS 
- - - - 
df MS 
- 
F 
Columns 9.877- 1 9.87e7l i6 . 9T2e7r 
T5 
.9 9 
J I 25-. 9T96 
Error 122.6 108 11.3W' 458 108 4.241 
123.6 109 460.6 109 
r-p-Value 1 0 . 3533 0.4354 
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Fig. 7.10. Plots of the residuals with error bars representing 21 cases of the final process 
steady state conditions identified by the qualitative rules. 
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Fig. 7.11. Box plots for the actual validation (column 1) and the model estimation (column 
2) values, showing the data spread from the mean 
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7.6 Isolation of Disturbances 
This section will discuss the method of identifying the type of disturbances and 
their magnitude, using the qualitative rules obtained by the proposed method. As 
discussed previously, there are two types of disturbances, which can influence the 
operation of the CSTR operation. Disturbances due to reactant feed temperature (Týjn), 
reactant feed concentration (Ca_in) and cooling water temperature (Twin) are non 
controllable. The other type of disturbances due to reactant feed flow, cooling water feed 
flow and the reactor level are controllable disturbances. The CSTR operation conditions 
will be influenced by changing the set point of the controller, e. g. by operators or due to 
controller malfunctioning. Qualitative rules can be developed to predict the type of 
disturbances. 
Purely for illustrative purpose, in the IF part of the rule, only three variables are 
considered, i. e., the product temperature (711_out), product concentration (Ca - out), and 
cooling water feed flow (Twin). Fig. 7.12 shows the PCI-PC2 plane of the variables, 
which represents IF condition elements and THEN statements of the rules. The clusters 
identified by the colours and the sections by the dark lines, which cut the clusters into 
forty eight parts. Table 7.12 shows the recognised cases by the qualitative rules during the 
validation process. Column one represents the validation case numbers identified by the 
qualitative model. Column two is the qualitative model rule numbers, which are similar to 
the IF condition elements of the validation cases in column one. Columns three to five 
are the variables, which are employed as the rule IF statement elements. Each variable 
represented by two small columns, which are C and S (table 7.12). Colu ' mns six, seven 
and eight are the rules THEN statements identified by the qualitative rules as clusters and 
sections of the set point and disturbances. The clusters and the sections of the 
disturbances are used for estimating the quantitative values of the set point and process 
disturbances. Table 7.13 shows the disagreement between the clusters and sections of the 
model estimation and the actual validation data. The table also indicates that there are two 
mismatches in the cluster column and six mismatches in the section column in set point 
estimation. The mismatch cases are expected because it is possible for the model to reveal 
clusters and sections, adjacent to those of the validation data clusters and sections. The 
last two columns of the table give the types of influences causing the process operation to 
shift from one state to another. Number two indicates that the human operator intervenes 
in the process operation, which causes the existing situation due to altering the controller 
set points. 
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Fig. 7.12. PCI-PC2 Planes of the process variables used as the qualitative model for 
disturbance isolation. 
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ualitative model clusters and sections outcome. 
14 
THEN 
Test 
Case 
No 
Rules 
No 
T-Out Ca-Out Twin Set- 
Point 
State 
Disturbance 
State 
Model 
Affect 
Type 
C SI c S CI s C S C S 
04 052 01 401 03 04 061 37. 04 13 
. 
01 
. 
10 2 
18 808 06 46 05 27 02 41 05 20 01 10 2 
36 713 04 33 01 06 02 20 05 33 01 10 2 
38 280 01 06 1 02 24 02 106 03 25 1 01 10 3 
46 1 711 04 05 1 03 05 06 1 44 04 46 1 01 , 
10 2 
64 086 01 04 03 20 04 37 09 22 01 03 2 
74 242 01 17 03_ 35 04 20 06 46 01 10 2 
76 161 01 29 03_ 40 03 27 01 
_02 
01 10 2 
84 660 04 33 01 06 04 42_ 09 44 01 10 2 
89 1 
__ 450 02 28 01 
- 
45 01 1 16 09 22 08 
9 T2- 45 -E 2 27 1 04 Fo5 1 09 , 33 01 10 12 
Set poi nt Disturbance 
Model 
Cluster 
No 
Test 
Cluster 
No 
Model 
Section 
No 
Test 
Section 
I 
No 
Model 
Cluster 
No 
Test 
Cluster 
No 
Model 
Section 
No 
Test 
Section 
No 
Model 
Affect 
Type 
Test 
Affect 
Type 
-4 13 13 1 1 10 10 2 2 
5 5 20, 20 1 1 10 10 2 2 
5 9 33 45 1 1 10 10 2 2 
3 3 25 26 1 1 10 10 3 2 
4 4 46 46 1 1 10 10 2 2 
9 9 22 13 1 1 3 10 1 2 2 
6 6 46 46 1 1 10 10 2' 2 
I 1 02 01 1 1 10 10 2 
- 
2 
9 44 43 1 1 10 10 2 2 
9 , 9 22 22 
8 8 23 23 2 3 
9 7 33 45 1 1 10 10 1 21 2 
Table 7.13. Comparison of the set point and disturbance state of the validation data 
r1usters and sections! 
'For model and test affect types 2 mean operator intervene and 3 mean disturbances. 
Number three indicates that the process operation conditions are caused by the 
process disturbances. There were two misses due to one condition sharing two types of 
effect. Theoretically, it is impossible to predict the type of the disturbances of the two 
missed cases, since both disturbances are independent variables. This can be 
demonstrated by the following example. If y=xl+x2, y can be estimated by knowing x, 
and x2, but x, and x2 cannot be estimated just by knowing y only because xt and x2 can 
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have any value. This type of problem can be solved by analysing the historical data, such 
as the probability of occurrence of these faults during the operation or by examining the 
previous condition to predict the present faults. The last suggestion can be easily 
demonstrated by this simple rule. 
IF previous=A and present--2 or present--3 THEN disturbance=3. 
IF previous=D and present--2 or present--3 THEN disturbance=2. 
A and D could be the cluster and section of IF statement. 
The quantitative values of the set point and the process disturbances are calculated 
using the clusters and sections of Table 7.12. The residual plots with 95% confidence for 
human operator intervention are shown in Fig. 7.13. The plots show two outliers. One 
occurs in the cooling water feed set point and the other in the reactor feed set point. 
Tables 7.14 and 7.15 reveal that the estimated set point for the identified cases is 
acceptable. The values are estimated from clusters and sections predicted by the 
qualitative rules, which represent the location of the disturbances. These tables also show 
that the estimated values and the validation values are identical because the Nvalue 
indicates that F statistic is as extreme as the observed F would occur by a9 out of ten 
chances if both actual and predicted values are truly equal. The box plots in Fig. 7.14 
shows the validation data (column one) has the same spread as the estimated values 
(column two) with overlapped notches. 
The residual plots in Fig. 7.15 with 95% confidence for the process disturbances 
show that there is one outlier case in each plot. The ANOVA Tables 7.16 and 7.17 
indicate that the quantitative values estimated for process disturbances is not as good as 
the set point value estimation cases. The box plots in Fig. 7.16 shows that the estimated 
values are spread along the value axis while the actual are concentrated around the mean. 
lb 
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Fig. 7.13. Plots of the residuals with error bars representing II cases identified by the 
qualitative rules. 
Table 7.14. ANOVA tables for feed and cooling water flow set point state 
-Va--riable F_in F out 
--F, o-; rce 
- 
SS df MS F ss df MS F 
-Fo lumns 62.01e-6 I 62. Ole' 11.8ge-3 -3 78.72e I 83.86e -4 
Error -2 10.43e' 20 -4 52.17e 18.77e' 20 93.87e' 
ýý 10ý=. 44e 21 18.78e' 21 
1 P-Value 1 0.9143 0.9279 
Table 7.15. ANOVA table for reactor level 
set Voint state. 
ariable L_Cstr 
columns 19.28e-3 I I 19.28e -3 76.05e-" 
E rrmor 50.71 
- 
20 25.36e- 3 :E 
ToFtal 50.73 21 
P-Value 0.9314 
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Fig. 7.14. Box plots for the validation values (column 1) and the model estimated values 
(column 2) showing the data spread from the mean for controller set points. 
The final case study is to predict the type of disturbances and the process 
disturbances variable data from the first few samples of the dynamic operation trends. 
Fig. 7.17 shows die qualitative model, which is constructed from samples 7,8 and 9 of 
the dynamic trends. A matrix was constructed, which has rows representing the case rinis 
(number of operations) and columns representing the six process variables, which are 
T_out, C-out, F_out, F_in, Twin and Lcstr. 
T11c three qualitative models developed from Samples 7,8 and 9, as shown in 
Table 7.18, represent the IF statement elements. These samples are chosen because their 
dam range has the highest vanation during the operation (see Fig. 7.5). The number of the 
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N 
identified cases is not important since the qualitative model can be trained and updated 
with new training data. The PCI-PC2 planes of Fig. 7.17 are classified into eleven 
clusters. Each cluster is sectioned to forty-eight sections. Table 7.18 shows all the 
validation data cases which are identified by the qualitative rules. The disturbances PCI- 
PC2 clusters and sections predicted by the qualitative rules are used to estimate the 
disturbance variables values. Table 7.19 shows the comparison between the predicted and 
the validated clusters and sections. The table also shows that the predicted cluster and 
section of the raw number 4 (values with grey background) are not identical to the 
validation cluster and section. This is an example of rules conflict where two identical IF 
statements give different THEN conditions. This can be eliminated by creating a new 
model from the training data with different number of clusters and sections as already 
discussed in Section 6.3.2 of chapter 6. This is because Section 3 of Cluster 10 is adjacent 
to the Section 12 of Cluster 4 (table 7.19). Fig. 7.18 shows that the two locations are very 
close and clusters 4 and 10 should be combined to a single cluster. The final two columns 
in the Table 7.19 show the type of disturbances. Two means human operator intervention 
by altering the set point of the controller during the process operation and three means the 
process disturbances was the cause of the present operational situation. 
The residual plots with 95% confidence are shown in Fig. 7.19 for each process 
disturbance. The ANOVA Tables 7.20 and 7.21 reveal that the model prediction of T-in 
and Twin are very accurate, because the Nvalue is close to one and Mactor is almost 
zero. The box plots of the T_in and Twin in Fig. 7.20 confirm the outcomes of ANOVA 
result. However, the model prediction of Ca - 
in is not so promising since the Nvalue 
indicates that F statistic as extreme as the observed F would occur by a chance of only 3 
out of 10 if both the actual and predicted values are truly equal to each other. 
Two methods are used in the isolation cases studies. The first method is developed 
using the trends of the independent variables of the process. The second method is 
developed using only the first few samples from process variables trends to estimate the 
disturbances. The second method can also be used online with the CSTR process for 
estimation of disturbances during process operation. Both methods indicate that some 
variables can be estimated more accurately than the others. Although the qualitative rules 
do not identify all the validation cases, this should not be considered as a limitation since 
all the qualitative rules can be trained with more data obtained from training cases 
covering all the regions of process operation conditions. 
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Fig. 7.15. Plots of the residuals with error bars representing II cases of the process 
disturbances identified by the qualitative rules. 
Table 7.16. The ANOVA tables for inlet feed and coolin waW temperaturc. 
Variable 
- 
T 
-out 
ca-Out 
-i; ý rce 
- 
SS df NIS F ss df NIS F 
-Eo- jumns 34.36e" I 34.36e-1 15.75e-' 64.0ge-3 I 64.08e -3 10.3i7 
Error 43.62 20 21.88e" 12.34 20 61.72e-2 
Total 47.05 21 12.41 21 
P-Value 0.2223 ý. 7506 
Table 7.17. The ANOVA table for inlet feed 
concenti-ation. 
-ý-arfikble Ca-In 
-goýrce SS df MS F 
Columns 42.84e4 I 42.84e4 26.5le 
Error 32.32e -2 20 16-16d-' 
Tot8l 32.75e" 21 
PMue 0.6123 
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Fig. 7.16. Box plots for the actual validation values (column 1) and the model estimated 
values (column 2) of disturbances data spreading from the mean. 
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Table 7.1 S. The clusters and the sections of the training data predicted by the qualitative 
models. 
IF THEN 
Training 
data 
Qualitative 
model rules 
Sample 7 Sample 8 Sample 9 Disturbance State 
cases No No C S C S C S C S 
08 438 04 16 11 16 06 17 10 13 
31 388 11 02 01 11 03 08 03 21 
32 016 09 05 04 05 11 17 10 13 
33 195 04 10 11 23 06 14 10 03 
40 004 02 05 07 06 07 05 10 13 
50 118 04 17 11 17 06 18 10 13 
62 026 09 05 04 05 11 18 10 13 
68 200 05 04 09 08 02 07 10 13 
80 440 04 17 11 17 09 1 06 10 13 
Table 7.19. Comparison of process disturbances between predictions and targets for the 
validation data. 
Model 
Cluster No 
Test Cluster 
No 
Model 
Section No 
Test Section 
No 
Model Effect 
Type 
Test Effect 
Type 
10 10 13 13 2 2 
03 03 21 21 2 3 
10 10 13 13 2 2 
10 04 03 12 3 0, 
10 10 13 13 2 2 
10 10 13 13 2 2 
10 10 13 13 2 2 
10 10 13 13 2 2 
10 10 13 13 2 2 
Table 7.20. The ANOVA tables for feed and cooling water temperature. 
Variable T-In Twin 
Source ss df NIS F SS dt' ms 
- 
1. 
--iAumns 27.44e 7 1 27.44e -7 53.56e-l 50.62C"4 1 50.62e -4 62.6c-5 
irror 12.67 16 79.2 1e2 129.4 16 80.85e-1 
Total 12.67 17 129.4 17 
P-Value 0.9985 0.9985 
Table7.2 I ANOVA table for feed concentration. 
Variable Ca-In 
Source ss df ms I., 
Columns 40.9e-5 1 40.9c-5 1.257 
Error 52.07e 4 16 32.55e'5 
Total 56.16e -4 17 
P-Value 0.2788 
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S121 
ýSll 
Fig. 7.18. Zoom in PCI-PC2 plane for clusters 4 and 10 of disturbances in Fig. 7.17, 
showing that cluster C4 is adjacent to cluster CIO (row number 4 of Table 7.19, which 
shows the values with a grey background), therefore these two clusters should be 
combined to a single cluster. 
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Fig. 7.19. Plots of the residuals with error bars representing 9 cases of the process 
disturbances identified by the qualitative rules. 
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Fig. 7.20. Box plots for the validation values or the training data values (column 1) and 
the model estimated values (column 2) of disturbances data spread from the mean. 
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7.7 Summary 
The method developed in chapter 6 for qualitative/quantitative modelling was 
applied to a case study of the joint process-operator system of a CSTR reactor. The 
procedures for developing and validating the rules for predicting variables and process's 
temporal states as well as for isolating disturbances were demonstrated. 
In the case of predicting the temporal states of variables and the pfocess, it was 
found that, while increasing the number of clusters and sections of the variables 
qualitative plane improves the accuracy of prediction for training data, the prediction for 
validation data deficient, indicate a simulation of overfitting. Therefore in determining the 
number of clusters and sections, there is a need to balance the accuracies for both the 
training and the test data. Similar result was obtained for the case of isolating 
disturbances. 
Examples were also given to show how to resolve conflicts in rules. In order to 
analyse the prediction errors more accurately, the qualitative predictions were used to 
reconstruct the quantitative values of variables using the PC coordinate values as well as 
loading matrix, mean and standard deviations of models. One-way analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) that is based on statistics was used throughout the chapter. It provides a 
rigorous method for such analysis. 
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Chapter 8 
Conclusions and Suggestions for Future Work 
8.1 Conclusions 
The work reported in this thesis is motivated mainly by the following observations 
on previous studies on computer aided systems for automatic identification and diagnosis 
of abnormal operations ofprocesses. 
Most previous studies assumed that after a fault occurring, the process would 
evolve without operators intervention. For example, high fidelity dynamic 
simulators have been widely used in developing and testing various techniques and 
tools for fault detection and diagnosis. They only emulate the process behaviour 
without considering possible operators intervention during the dynamic transition. 
Almost all the studies on automatic fault detection and diagnosis have focused on 
only part of the integrated system, i. e., the process part. No effort has been made on 
automatic monitoring and assessing the other part, i. e., the operators. 
The lack of effort in integrating operators' factors into automated fault detection 
and diagnostic system is disproportionate to statistics. According to a worldwide survey 
carried out by a Honeywell led consortium (Nimmo, 1995), 40% of faults happened in 
chemical history is due to human errors. A parallel study on case histories by the Health 
and Safety Commission (Larder and Fleming, 1996) indicated that 80% of accidents have 
human factors involved. Efforts to address human errors in process safety have so far 
limited to hazard and operability studies in the process design stage, training of 
operational personnel and prediction of human reliability. 
The overall objectives of the research were to develop a methodology to involve 
the human factors into the development of systems for automatic identification and 
diagnosis of abnormal operations, and to investigate methods and techniques that can be 
used to capture, characterise and assess the performance of operators as well as that of the 
process. 
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(1) 
The main achievements of the research are: 
A critical review has been made in chapter 2 of the previous work on computer- 
based automatic detection and diagnosis of process abnormal operations. The 
review covered the techniques of real-time expert systems, univariate and 
multivariate statistic process control, supervised and unsupervised neural networks 
as well as data pre-processing technologies, hybrid systems and digraphs. The 
review also revealed the need to carry out studies on integrating human factors into 
the development of fault detection and diagnosis systems. 
(2) A platform is developed for carrying out the studies, which is a join process-operator 
dynamic simulation environment. The process part is a dynamic process simulator, 
which emulates in high fidelity the dynamic behaviour of the process under the 
influence of various disturbances as well as operator's actions. The operator part is 
coded as a real time expert system emulating operators' behaviour and the 
interaction between the process simulator and the real time expert system was 
managed through an interaction model. The dedicated interaction model manages 
the synchronisation through dynamic data exchange (DDE), transformation of data 
formats, and also serves as an interface for initiating variations and performing data 
analysis. The effectiveness of the platform was proved in case studies presented in 
chapters 4,6 and 7. The tools include principal component analysis (PCA) fuzzy c- 
means, fuzzy logic, neural networks and signed digraphs. 
(3) As part of the joint process-operator simulation platform, a system has also been 
developed for modelling and simulation of operator's behaviour. The system was 
developed based on the theoretical model of Cacciabue (1999) on operator's 
behaviour which breaks operator's activities into perception of the signal and the 
interpretation of received information, planning for actions and execution of the 
decisions. The system was implemented as a real-time expert system using visual 
Prolog. The advantage of the rule-based system is that the rules can be easily 
revised to reflect various cognitive scenarios. Numerical models were also integrated 
into the expert system, e. g., the stress models of operators. 
(4) As part of the effort to use the platform to develop methods and tools for 
characterising and assessing the dynamic behaviour of operators, processes and the 
joint system, a digraph method for qualitative/quantitative modelling of the dynamic 
behaviour of combined process-operator systems was developed. The method 
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involves categorical characterisation of dynamic trend signals using PCA and fiizzy 
c-means, and sectioning of the clusters. A method based on the global performance 
was derived for defining the numbers of clusters and sections. Compared with 
previous methods, the proposed approach is more accurate, has higher resolution, 
and is able to deal withjoin process-operator systems. 
The proposed methods and systems developed have been tested and evaluated 
using simulated and industrial case studies. They proved to be able to capture and 
characterise operator's behaviour in terms of stress, time of intervention, frequency of 
interventions, error handling procedure and near-miss or near-hit. The methods are also 
proved effective in capturing the dynamic behaviour of the joint system. 
8.2 Suggestions for Future Work 
While the value of the proposed methods has been demonstrated, there are even 
greater potential benefits to be realised through the following studies. 
(1) Developments of a multifunctional data mining system that can be fully integrated 
into modem computer control systems to continuously capture, characterise and 
assess the performance of operators skills and behaviour in fingerprint detail (Fig 
8.1,82). The results of this study using principal component analysis and 
qualitative/quantitative digraphs have proved the feasibility of the idea. Such a 
system can be very useful because it has the potential to capture the near-miss 
situation and help correct operatoes inappropriate operations. It is expected that 
more tools need to be integrated and carefully coordinated in order to be effective for 
practical use. However there is information about operators that cannot be captured 
by the data recorded by control computers, therefore there is also a need to 
investigate what other information is vital and how to collect it. 
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(2) Making use of the joint simulation system to carry out studies on other issues 
concerning human factors in process operation and control, such as: 
flow do temporally evolving situation, as compared with static one shot decision 
situation, create different cognitive demands and provides opportunities for 
different cognitive strategies? 
How is intentional focus managed in fields of activity that are data rich and involve 
multiple interleaved tasks? 
How do possibilities for action limit cognitive systems? 
What is the contribution of perceptual or pattern processing to cognition? 
How does effort or cognitive cost play a role in cognition systems given finite 
resources accessible to human or machine agents within a cognitive system? 
(3) To carry out the study of (2), there is the need to develop more sophisticated human 
models. The operatoesmodel in this work, though is sufficient for the current study, 
is still relatively simple. Development of higher fidelity models may require 
chemical engineers to work together with human behaviour research scientists. 
(4) The system can be extended to study the cooperation of operators during process 
operation particularly in abnormal situations. 
(5) The proposed digraph method for qualitative/quantitative modelling and simulation 
of the dynamic behaviour of joint process-operator systems still has scope for 
improvement. First the approach of qualitative interpretation of dynamic trend 
signals using PCA, fuzzy c-means and sectioning of clusters are still not able to 
identify a spike of a sudden change (see Figs 6.14 and 6.15) because the spike is 
negligible and buried in the data. In addition, efficient optimisation methods could 
be developed to replace the iterative method for determining the numbers of clusters 
and sections of individual variables and of the process. 
(6) This study has focused on continuous processes. It is expected that batch processes 
will pose more challenges because of the distinctive nature of batch operations that 
there are no steady states. The operator's factor can be even more important than in 
continues processes. 
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Nomenclature 
A- the number of the selected first few principal components (PC's) 
a,, a2 - two scalars used to define the membership value, (e. g. a, = 3, ai=8) 
c- number of cluster 
C, - the th cluster number 
du - the Euclidean distance ofj* data case from i" cluster centre 
df - degree of freedom 
e- effect strength in a fully signed directed diagraph 
E- sum of squares of difference between the neural networks outputs and the target 
values 
k- number of observation 
L- liquid level 
m- membership value, function of v and depend on a, & a2 
m- number of data case 
M- fuzzy set 
M- number of training data patterns 
MS - mean square 
n- total number of data point 
N- number of neurons in the output layer 
p, - first raw of the PCA loading matrix 
p2 - second raw of the PCA loading matrix 
R,, j - the value range of the jh node 
R,, j,., - the value range of thejh +1 node 
S, j - estimated variance of the 
e principal component tj 
Sjj, l - sensitivity of thejdnode to thej"' +1 node 
SPE - squared prediction error 
ý,, j - sum of square of 
the columns SS, 
SSE - sum of square of the error 
tj - first principal component (PCI) 
t2 - second principal component (PC2) 
2-2 - Hotelling T-squared statistic 
tj - the th Principal component 
1114 
tjý') - target value of the th output neuron for the given m1l, data pattern 
,u- 
Membership function 
v- vector represent the normalised value of liquid level (L) 
xj - thet data case 
yU - matrix of observation 
yj - actual observation value 
yj - the 
e cluster centre 
yj(') - the prediction for the ýh output neuron given the mth data pattern 
y,,,.., - new observation 
- estimated value from the reference PCA model 
model estimated values 
means of the observation values 
Symbols 
0- Degree of fuzziness parameter 
cij - matrix of random disturbances 
aj - matrix whose columns are the group means (the 'dot j' notation means that CL applies 
to all rows of the jh column) 
OU - Fuzzy membership value ofjh data case belonging to ia cluster 
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